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INTRODUCTION
Listen now to the story of the Elephant .... In Hind it was that
the keepers of the Elephant desired to show the Elephant to curi-
ous ones. Yet it was in a dark room. The seekers came and felt of
it, since they could not see. One, laying his hand on its trunk,
said, "This creature is like a water-pipe." Another, feeling its ear,
said, "Verily it is a fan." A third came upon its leg, and he said,
"Nay, beyond doubt it is a pillar." Had any one brought a candle
to the room, all would have seen the same.
* Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law;, Director, Cumberland
Legal Aid Clinic. B.A., J.D., Notre Dame University.
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"And where," Omar asked, "will you find a candle to enlighten
the world?"
Mr. Woodburn was accused of sexually abusing his eldest son. At
trial he called Dr. Sobchuk as a witness. Dr. Sobchuk, a licensed
psychologist, had been treating the boy at the state's request. The
doctor was to testify that the boy suffered from a number of emo-
tional problems which resulted in an inability to distinguish fantasy
from reality, an overwhelming need to please adults and avoid pun-
ishment, and the inability or refusal to accept personal responsibil-
ity with a concomitant absence of remorse for misconduct, including
lying. The trial justice refused to permit the doctor to testify on
these matters. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Mr. Woodburn
appealed, claiming error in the trial court's exclusion of Dr.
Sobchuk's testimony.2 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as
the Law Court, affirmed. Justice Hornby dissented:
It is disturbing to me that in evaluating the credibility of an
eight-year-old boy,8 the critical and uncorroborated witness in this
case, the jury is not entitled to hear the opinion of an independent
clinical psychologist who, wholly apart from this criminal prosecu-
tion, had been assessing the boy's truthfulness by checking his sto-
ries over a nine-month period. I agree with the Court that the
Maine Rules of Evidence seem to compel that result, but in doing
so they are fundamentally unfair.4
Justice Hornby's words are the essence of tragedy. The rule of law
is to prevent injustice, not to compel it. The trial was fundamentally
unfair. If the jury had heard Dr. Sobchuk's testimony, the verdict
may still have been guilty. How the jury weighed the credibility of
the boy's accusations will never be known, but they did so without
information that would have helped them.
Do the Maine Rules of Evidence require exclusion of Dr.
Sobchuk's testimony? Psychiatrists and psychologists testify almost
daily as expert witnesses, and courts accept the validity of their re-
spective sciences. Their opinions are routinely admitted as aids to
1. H. LAMB, OmAS KHAYYAM 138-39 (1971).
2. State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343, 344 (Me. 1989). The defendant also asserted
two other grounds on appeal. He claimed the trial justice erred in finding the boy
competent to testify as a witness. Defense counsel did not call Dr. Sobchuk as a wit-
ness on the issue of the boy's competence. He also claimed error in the trial justice's
refusal to ask certain questions on voir dire of the jury panel. The trial justice sub-
mitted the questions in written form, declining to ask the questions orally. Id. The
Supreme Judicial Court found no error on either ground.
3. The child was six years old at the time of the alleged abuse. Id.
4. Id. at 347 (Hornby, J., dissenting). The majority ultimately found Dr.
Sobchuk's testimony to be impermissible character evidence under the Maine Rules
of Evidence. Id. at 346. It was this argument Justice Hornby felt compelled the re-
sult. The majority also questioned the foundation of the scientific validity of Dr.
Sobchuk's diagnosis and, apparently, the doctor's qualifications as an expert. Id.
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the pursuit of truth-unless the testimony relates to the credibility
of another witness. Expert witnesses testifying about the credibility
of other witnesses are perceived as truthsayers. The very concept of
a truthsayer in the court invokes a brooding unease in the legal
psyche. However welcome their testimony on other subjects, when
called to testify on credibility, the behavioral scientists find their
professional judgments subjected to a polite, largely unspoken, but
implacable. antipathy.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony on credibility. State v. Woodburn serves as a lens to
focus on the broader issues. The primary issue is an examination of
expert testimony on credibility in light of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and their progeny. The Rules of Evidence mandate admission
or exclusion of expert testimony based on certain criteria. How are
these criteria applied to expert testimony on credibility? How
should they be applied? The surprising survivability of other crite-
ria discarded by the Rules is also considered.
A. The Truthsayer
The state's case against Mr. Woodburn rested entirely upon the
testimony of an eight-year-old boy, the eldest of the Woodburns'
two sons. Life for the Woodburn family was "unstable and difficult.
Between 1979 and 1985 the Woodburns... lived in some fifteen
different places, including in an automobile. [Mrs.] Woodburn
treated [her oldest son] violently on many occassions [sic], often
striking him for no apparent reason."" In 1985, Mrs. Woodburn and
a Mr. Brown entered into a relationship. Mr. Woodburn and Mrs.
Brown also entered into a relationship and went to California for
several months. The two boys stayed in Maine with Mrs. Woodburn
and Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown abused the older boy. "At this time, [the
older boy] was exposed to pornographic magazines and videotapes.
He ran at least one pornographic videotape through the VCR by
himself."8
In June, 1985, Mr. Woodburn and Mrs. Brown returned to Maine.
They and the two boys moved in with Mr. Woodburn's mother,
stepfather, and stepbrother. The home had two bedrooms and a
combined kitchen/living area. Mrs. Brown left a month later.7 One
of the two bedrooms was shared by Mr. Woodburn, his two sons,
and his stepbrother. The room had three beds.
[A]ttempts to get [the older boy] to sleep with [his younger
5. Brief for Appellant at 8, State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343 (Mle. 1989) (No.
LIN-88-35). The Woodburns also had a daughter, who was removed from the Wood-
burns' custody by the state at the age of eight months. Id. The reasons for this action
do not appear on the record.
6. Id. (citations to transcript omitted).
7. Id. at 9.
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brother] failed because the boys would "raise chaos" and kick each
other until they were separated. [Mr. Woodburn and his eldest son
eventually began sleeping in the same bed. The older boy] would
often wet the bed. ... When the bed was wet, the defendant
would awaken the child and change his pajamas and the bedsheets,
often accompanied by a spanking and much angry shouting. [The
boy] was embarrassed by his inability to control his bladder, and
angry at being frequently berated about something over which he
had no control.
During this period, [the boy] had a number of behavior problems
at home and school, frequently getting into fights with other
children.'
The Maine Department of Human Services had been providing
services to Mr. Woodburn's mother for some time.9 The social
worker asked Dr. Sobchuk, a licensed psychologist, to evaluate Mr.
Woodburn's competence as a parent. 0 In August, 1985, the social
worker also referred the boy to Dr. Sobchuk for treatment at the
grandmother's request." Dr. Sobchuk met with the boy twenty-four
times over the next six months. The sessions usually lasted one
hour. 2 The Department eventually removed the boy from the
Woodburn home for reasons unrelated to any allegation of sexual
abuse by the father, and placed him in a foster home in a remote
location. The boy was very lonely. The foster mother, who could not
tolerate the boy's bedwetting, forced him to wear diapers and sleep
in the bathtub."' While at the foster home, the boy accused his fa-
ther of sexual abuse during the time they slept in the same bed at
his grandmother's house.' 4 Dr. Sobchuk had treated the boy
throughout much of the period in which the abuse allegedly
occurred.
At trial, Mr. Woodburn called Dr. Sobchuk as an expert witness.
Dr. Sobchuk testified about his qualifications, and his evaluation of
Mr. Woodburn. The direct examination then turned to the doctor's
treatment and diagnosis of the boy. The state objected. An extensive
voir dire followed. Dr. Sobchuk testified the boy suffered from a
8. Id. at 9-10 (citations to transcript omitted).
9. It appears these services were in place when the defendant and his sons moved
in with the mother. It is unclear from the record as to why the mother's household
was receiving services from the Department of Human Services (DHS). The services
may have been related to defendant's half brother, who had Down's Syndrome. Id. at
9.
10. Transcript at 308-10, State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343 (Me. 1989) (No. CR
87-291 & CR 87-292). Dr. Sobchuk also evaluated Mr. Woodburn to determine func-
tional disability for Social Security purposes during 1985. Id.
11. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 10.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 12.
14. It is unclear whether the accusation was spontaneous, or the result of ques-
tioning by the social worker. Id. at 12-13, n.9.
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"medically recognized syndrome."1 As a result of his emotional dis-
ability, the boy differed from other children his age in that.
A. His ability to separate fact from fiction was "highly suspect. He
was often times mixing facts and fantasy." 10
B. He had a need to gain attention and to please which was "ele-
vated to pathology."17 "He aimed to please the examiner [by saying]
whatever... he felt the examiner wanted to hear"18 and "[was] just
going to do almost anything to please you."10
C. He told lies, "show[ing] very little remorse or... very little signs
or understanding of the consequences. . . ,,s2 The boy, "with few
exceptions, was not telling the truth."21
D. His exposure to pornographic material may have "sensitize[d]
him prematurely" to sexual matters, causing him to "use his imagi-
nation and transcend a lot of the reality if, in fact, it served his
purpose, if he wanted to please you. '22
Dr. Sobchuk also stated that the basis of his diagnosis included
the boy's allegations of sexual activities with a girl his own age. This
allegation prompted an investigation which revealed that the girl
simply did not exist. Dr. Sobchuk concluded: "[Y]ou would have to
wonder whether or not it's a pathological lie, whether or not there is
fantasy.... There maybe [sic] both for [the boy], particularly at
this age. But he definitely, he is definitely telling a lie. 123
Aware that the boy slept in the same bed with his father, Dr.
Sobchuk was concerned about the possibility of abuse.2' On three
occasions, Dr. Sobchuk spent most of his session with the boy trying
to determine if he was being abused.20 In view of the boy's mental
and emotional problems, Dr. Sobchuk structured his inquiries care-
fully. He "tried not to lead [the boy] and conduct[ed] a casual, if
not superficial inquiry, as to what was transpiring at home between
dad and [the boy]." 26 The results were the same on all three occa-
sions. The boy gave no indication that any inappropriate contact
15. Transcript, supra note 10, at 329.
16. Id. at 327.
17. Id. at 346.
18. Id. at 327. Dr. Sobchuk further explained. "I think if you take a look at [the
boy's] environment, there is nowhere to please. There is absolutely nowhere to please.
. .. f] all of a sudden .. he will find someone who is willing to accept him and
adopt him and listen to him. It's amazing to him." Id. at 334.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 327. Noting that pathological lying is "a rather harsh concept to draw,"
Dr. Sobchuk concluded that, "for the most part," the concept applied. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 335.
23. Id. at 336.
24. According to Dr. Sobchuk, the DHS social worker was "very eager" to get
evidence the boy was being abused by his father. Id. at 349.
25. Id. at 331.
26. Id.
1991]
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was occurring between him and his father.27 Dr. Sobchuk was confi-
dent the boy would have disclosed any abuse that was occurring.20
In view of his other findings, Dr. Sobchuk "would still have [had a]
strong suspicion about whether or not [the child] had, in fact, been
sexually abused,' 29 even if the boy had claimed his father abused
him.
B. The Court
The trial justice sustained the state's objection to Dr. Sobchuk's
testimony about the boy's credibility.30 The justice first recited with-
out comment the substance of Rule 404(b)31 and Rule 702.11 The
justice then turned to Rule 704:3
Rule 704 deals with the opinion on the ultimate issue and it is
discretionary with the trial judge as to whether or not opinion on
the ultimate issue will be allowed.. . . [I]n the instant case, and I
have no questions whatsoever about the qualifications of Doctor
Sobchuk, I am impressed by his credentials but the nature of the
testimony that is being offered through Doctor Sobchuk is, as far
as I am concerned, just as consistent with sexual abuse as not with
sexual abuse and the Court, as stated in the commentary to Rule
704 and 704.11 that, of course, the trial judge has his usual discre-
tion to exclude under Rule 40381 opinions, the probative value of
which is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
or confusion or which would tend to be a waste of time.
27. Id. at 339-40.
28. Id. at 340-41.
29. Id. at 349.
30. Id. at 345.
31. M.R. Evid. 404(b) reads:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith.
This language is identical to its federal counterpart. The Maine version omits the
remaining sentence of the federal rule, which reads: "It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EvD. 404(b). The
advisers' note to the Maine rule uses substantially identical language in explaining
the limits of testimony excluded by the rule. R FIELD & P. MURRAY, MAINE EVIDENCE
105 (2d ed. 1987). This suggests that the Maine drafters omitted the last sentence of
the federal rule as superfluous, rather than from any decision to create a substantive
difference.
32. M.R. Evid. 702 (expert opinion testimony) is identical to FED. R. EvID. 702.
33. The substantive provisions of M.R. Evid. 704 are identical to FED. R. EVID.
704(a). Maine has not amended the rule to include provisions similar to FED. R. EVID.
704(b) (banning expert testimony on a criminal defendant's mental state when it is
an element of the crime).
34. The trial justice is apparently referring to R. FIELD & P. MURRAY, MAINE EVI-
DENCE 262-68 (2d ed. 1987).
35. M.R. Evid. 403, Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice,
Confusion, or Waste of Time, is identical with FED. R. EVID. 403.
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It is the conclusion of this Court that this borders so closely
upon the testimony on the ultimate issue as to the credibility of
[the boy] that the testimony of Doctor Sobchuk is excluded."0
Before considering the problems raised by Woodburn and similar
cases under the Rules of Evidence, it is appropriate to briefly con-
sider the problem of credibility in a broader perspective.
L THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
The adversarial trial and lay jury, linked by the law of evidence,
have proven remarkably effective in minimizing injustice caused by
errors in determining factual truth.3 7 Among the English-speaking
peoples of the world, it is their common boast that the common law
jury finds truth and serves justice better than any other system. Yet
even the most zealous advocate of the common law jury will concede
that the accuracy rate in this regard is less than one hundred
percent.
A. The Pursuit of Truth
In the lexicon of metaphysics, truth and justice are synonyms on
the deepest level of meaning. Our concept of jurisprudence recog-
nizes that justice can only be attained through ascertainment of the
truth. "There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a funda-
mental goal of our legal system."38 The law of evidence is intended
as a catalyst to facilitate this process.39
Eliciting the witness's account of any past event involves percep-
tion, memory, and communication. Absent evidence to the contrary,
the witness is assumed to possess a basic competency in each of
these activities. Each activity, however, is subject to all the limita-
tions and frailties of the human condition.
Perception is subject to the limitations of newtonian physics upon
individual perspective. It is also subject to physiological limitations
36. Transcript, supra note 10, at 351-52 (emphasis added).
37. The effectiveness of the common law jury in justly, or at least rigorously, ap-
plying the law is perhaps less certain. This is hardly surprising. The jury was, at least
in part, intended to provide a final bulwark against the imposition of the sovereigns
will upon individual citizens. In this respect the jury is intended as a device for the
misapplication of law. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). See also Addre s
by Chief Judge Singleton to the International Society of Barristers, reprinted in Sin-
gleton, Jury TriaL" History and Preservation, 32 TrAL LAw. GumE 273 (1989).
38. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980). The skeptic may disagree.
The trial is often perceived as a competition between parties striving to portray fan-
tasy as truth. This view results from a confusion of the parties' goals with those of
society. The societal goal is to administer justice based upon discovery of the truth.
The jury trial is the device selected to obtain this goal. The adverearial trial makes no
impossible demand of impartiality on the parties. It presumes their opinions as to the
truth will differ.
39. See FED. IR Evm. 102.
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and variations in individuals' sensory experience. Beyond these
physical limitations, perception is also distorted by an observer's bi-
ases, expectations, desires, and fears. These influences produce sub-
liminal distortions in the perceptions of the most rigorously honest.
They also tempt to falsehood.
Memory is a bridge from the present to the past. Memory, like a
bridge, is a human construct. It is the individual's subjective at-
tempt to create the mental impression of a perception not being ex-
perienced. Memory is the zealous servant of its master. The bridge
is built, maintained, and modified according to the needs of the in-
dividual. Few people are blessed with total recall; everyone must
pave over gaps in his or her memory. This process is so common it
becomes automatic, subsiding below the level of conscious aware-
ness.40 Trial witnesses are subject to additional influences. Many, if
not most, witnesses believe they have a stake in the outcome. Even
the "impartial" witness tends to identify with or against the cause of
one party. This tendency is encouraged by trained advocates skilled
in the subtle arts of persuasion and manipulation. Consciously and
unconsciously, the memory and testimony of witnesses vary from
the original perception.
Communication is also subject to similar limitations. The wit-
ness's ability to describe perceptions is limited. The question or an-
swer may contain undetected ambiguities. The hearer's ability to
understand is limited by the same factors which limit all human
perception and understanding. In addition, the trial setting imposes
its own limitations and opportunities for miscommunication. The
public forum, adversarial procedures, and evidentiary rules are unfa-
miliar to the average witness and juror. Furthermore, a witness may
consciously distort or falsify.
None of this is recent revelation. The law has recognized these
problems in the fact-finding process as far back as the twelfth cen-
tury. In response, a number of devices have been tried to enhance
the pursuit of justice through truth. Trials by ordeal or combat were
early attempts to solve the problem. Calling upon the Godhead to
resolve disputes was an understandable reaction to the realization
40. The same phenomenon occurs in perception. A series of still photographs
viewed seriatim are seen as a moving picture. Similar is the lack of awareness of
blinking as an interruption of sight. This phenomenon received judicial recognition in
United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976):
Witnesses focus on gross or salient characteristics of any sensory experi-
ence, and fill in the details... according to some previously internalized
pattern they associate with the perceived gross characteristics. In addition,
the construction of memory is greatly influenced by post-experience sugges-
tion. Suggestions compatible with the witness' internalized stereotype are
likely to become part of the witness' memory . . . because they fit the
preconceived stereotype.
Id. at 1066 (citations omitted).
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that human justice is often defenseless against good faith error and
the plausible lie told by the practiced liar.
In trial by combat or ordeal, the sheriff gathered the freeholders
of the district, bringing them to "some ancient moot-hill, which ever
since the times of heathenry [had] been the scene of justice."' 1 The
freeholders were called to serve as "doomsmen." They were to be
witnesses of the judgment, not the evidence. "If of two litigants the
one contradicts the other flatly, if the plain 'You did' of the one is
met by the straight-forward 'You-lie' of the other, here is a problem
that man cannot solve.. . . He has recourse to the supernatural'4 2
Trials by ordeal or combat, however, were based upon belief in a
proactive divinity willing to stand as surety for human justice. Over
the centuries the belief developed that the Godhead had washed its
hands of any obligation to intervene in the human pursuit of tempo-
ral justice.43 Viewed from this perspective, trial by jury is the
fallback method selected by our ancestors to deal with the problem
of witness credibility.
The retreat was not a rout; a grudging rear guard has fought every
step of the way." Initially the common law did not entirely abandon
recourse to a higher authority. Trial by battle, with its interesting
mix of an appeal to divine justice and simple pragmatism, persisted
for centuries.4'5 A party, or a witness serving as the party's cham-
pion, would swear to the truth of the party's cause and then would
offer to defend his or her oath in mortal combat. The wisdom of this
approach goes beyond a hope that God would arrange for right to
prevail over might. The modern witness in the equivalent situation
may fear the ordeal of cross-examination and might worry about the
risk of conviction for perjury. On the other hand, ancient witnesses
had to be willing to risk death if their testimony was challenged.
41. F. llMLAND, 2 THE CoEcTD PAPmS OF FREnmucK WA u ATLAND 445-
46 (HA.L. Fisher ed. 1911).
42. Id.
43. The Church prohibited participation by the clergy in trials by ordeal in a de-
cree of the Fourth Lateran Council issued in 1215. J. THAxEi. PRnMMMRY TREAT E
ON EVmENCE AT THE COMOsN LAw 36-38 (1896).
44. Id. at 38-39. "The 'Mirror', written, as Maitland conjectures, between 1285
and 1290, regrets that [trial by ordeal] has gone by. 'It is an abuse,' says the writer,
'that proofs and purgations are not made by the miracle of God where no other proof
can be had.' In 1679 a defendant astonished the court by asking to be tried by
ordeal" Id. at 38.
45. Trial by battle, as opposed to trial by ordeal, proved a more durable fixture of
the common law. Professor Thayer notes instances occurring in 1531, 1638, and, "in
an Irish case in 1815... to the amazement of mankind, the defendant escaped by
means of this rusty weapon." Id. at 45 (footnote omitted). In another case, "the fa-
mous appeal of murder.., in which the learning of the subject was fully discussed
by the King's Bench, [the] battle was adjudged to be still 'the constitutional mode of
trial' in this sort of case." Id. (footnote omitted). Trial by combat was finally abol-
ished in 1819. Id.
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Contemplation of such a risk might tend to encourage more honesty.
Permitting the parties to be represented by champions skilled in
personal combat arguably had an opposite effect.
The determination of truth at trial is necessarily based primarily
upon the living memory of witnesses. The common law jury is as-
signed the task of determining truth from evidence which is inevita-
bly less than the "truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth." The jury must construct a mosaic of the truth from a jumble
of pieces. At best, most of the pieces are only approximations of the
truth, and some may be deliberate falsehoods. 46 The problem re-
mains. Errors occur."
B. Freud, the Professor, and the Dean
Starting from folk wisdom and philosophical speculation, the be-
havioral sciences have grown into an accepted body of scientific in-
quiry and knowledge in less than a century. In the late nineteenth
century, Sigmund Freud pioneered a new field of knowledge devoted
to understanding the human mind. The relevance of this knowledge
to the trial process quickly became apparent. So did the legal pro-
fession's reluctance to accept the behavioral scientist as an aid to
determining credibility issues. As early as 1909, Harvard psychology
professor Hugo Miinsterberg already felt the courts were proving
unreasonably recalcitrant.
The lawyer and the judge and the juryman are sure that they do
not need the experimental psychologist. They do not wish to see
that in this field pre-eminently applied experimental psychology
has made strong strides, led by Binet, Stern, Lipmann, Jung, Wert-
heimer, Gross, Sommer, Aschaffenburg, and other scholars. They
go on thinking that their legal instinct and their common sense
46. For an interesting study of how jurors resolve conflicts in the evidence or its
interpretation, see Kassin, Reddy & Tulloch, Juror Interpretations of Ambiguous
Evidence: The Need for Cognition, Presentation Order, and Persuasion, 14 LAw &
Huh. BEHAv. 43 (1990).
47. The recent move to equip police cars with video cameras is clearly an attempt
to avoid such problems. Taping field sobriety tests circumvents the need to rely upon
the disparate memories of the defendant and the arresting officer. The technology
solution may have only limited application, however. Intoxication is unique in that it
involves persistent and largely unavoidable physiological effects which are usually ap-
parent to the lay person.
Cross-examination and witness confrontation before the jury are two traditional
devices intended to assist the jury in assessing credibility. The recent explosion of
child abuse cases has raised concerns that these devices may carry too high a human
cost for the victims. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012 (1988). Compare Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d
366 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 535 N.E.2d 193 (1989).
Limitations on these traditional methods of determining truth suggest the need for
an increase in other forms of assistance to jurors in resolving credibility issues.
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supplies them with all that is needed and somewhat more .... 41
Dean Wigmore rushed to defend the legal profession. He counter-
attacked with satire. With mock outrage, he scripted a hypothetical
trial in which Dr. Miinsterberg was accused of and found liable for
defaming the entire legal profession. Dr. Mtlnsterberg's feeble at-
tempts to defend were unavailing. He was liable.4 0
C. The Emperor's New Clothes
Eventually, legal commentators recognized the emerging field of
behavioral science as a long sought, if not exactly God-sent, aid to
the problems of determining credibility. In spite of his initial reser-
vations, by 1937 Dean Wigmore had changed his mind. He was
ready to accept the behavioral scientist as an expert witness not
only on the mental condition of a witness, but also on the witness's
"testimonial trustworthiness."5 0 The courts proved more difficult to
48. L MONSTERBERG, ON THE WnMs STAND 10-11 (1917). It should come as no
surprise to learn that Professor Monsterberg was not a lawyer. Professor Mainsterberg
also proved unpopular with the public:
I ventured last year to write a letter to a well-known nerve specialist in
Chicago who had privately asked my opinion as a psychologist in the case of
a man condemned to death for murder. The man had confessed the crime.
Yet I felt sure that he was innocent. My letter somehow reached the papers
and I became the target for editorial sharpshooters everywhere. ...
"Harvard's Contempt of Court" is the big heading here, "Science Gone
Crazy" the heading there, and so it went on in the papers, while every mail
brought an epistolary chorus. ....
* * .And if the sensational press did not manifest a judicial temper, that
seemed this time very excusable .... (A]s long as a demand for further
psychological inquiry appeared... as "another way of possibly cheating
justice" and as a method tending "towards emasculating court procedure
and discouraging and disgusting every faithful officer of the law," the neu"-
papers were almost in duty bound to rush on in the tracks of popular
prejudice.
I took it thus gladly as a noble outburst of Chicago feeling against my
"long-distance impudence" that a leading paper resumed the situation in
this way: "Illinois has quite enough of people with an itching mania for
attending to other people's business without importing impertinence from
Massachusetts. This crime itself, no matter who may be the criminal, was
one of the frightful fruits of a sickly paltering with the stern administration
of law. We do not want any directions from Harvard University irrespon-
sibles for paltering still further." This seems to me to hit the nail on the
head exactly, and my only disagreement is with the clause "no matter who
may be the criminal." I think it does matter who may be the criminal
Id. at 139-42 (emphasis added).
49. Wigmore, Professor Mtansterberg and the Psychology of Euidence, 3 ILL L
REv. 399 (1909).
50. Wigmore, Jury-Trial Rules of Evidence in the Next Century, in 1 LAw, A
CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835-1935, 360 (A. Reppy ed. 1937). See also Convis, Testify-
ing About Testimony: Psychological Evidence on Perceptual and Memory Factors
Affecting the Credibility of Testimony, 21 DuQ. L Rv. 579 (1983).
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convince. The ancient and venerable jury system may recognize the
difficulty of getting safely across the intersection of Truth and
Falsehood. It is, however, unwilling to accept the assistance of the
eager young scout of science, anxious to do a good deed.
The behaviorists insist on reminding us how rudimentary is the
general knowledge of perception, memory, and communication. 1 Ju-
rors' understanding of the forces that affect perception, memory,
and communication is limited to the individual juror's self-knowl-
edge and knowledge of others derived from the random experiences
of everyday life. Collectively, the normal jury is by definition igno-
rant of the abnormal.5 2 Even worse, the interloping experts demon-
strate that such common wisdom as exists on the subject is also
often demonstrably wrong.53
The accuracy of the witness's perception, recall, and communica-
tion is only half the equation of our professional faith in the trial
process. The jury's ability to assess accuracy is equally essential. Ex-
isting research strongly suggests society in general, and the legal
profession in particular, may seriously overestimate the lay jury's
ability to determine truth, especially with respect to some common
types of testimony. The question of eyewitness identification has
been the subject of considerable research and will serve as a single
example. There is no evidence more damning than a confident eye-
witness who looks the defendant in the eye, points, and positively
identifies him or her as the person who committed the crime. Attor-
neys and judges recognize that in-court identification is the essence
51. For comprehensive surveys of the scientific findings concerning these and
other factors affecting the accuracy of testimony, see Johnson, Cross-Racial Identifi-
cation Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 934 (1984); Convis, supra note
50; Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility, 34 GEe. WASH. L. Rv. 53
(1965). These articles offer the following examples: there are demonstrable and signif-
icant differences in the ability to identify individuals of a different race by sight.
Similarly, the ability to recognize and identify voices differs markedly between
women and men (i.e., men are more than twice as accurate as women in recognizing
individual female voices (95.5% correct versus 46.7%)).
52. On the broad scale this proposition is a statistical certainty. In the individual
case, preemptive challenges effectively ensure the absence of any juror possessing spe-
cial experience, skill, knowledge, or training relevant to any issue the jury must de-
cide, including credibility.
53. For example, it is commonly accepted that the memory of the elderly is less
acute than that of the young. In fact, this is true only in a very limited sense. Tests
have been conducted pitting age against youth in eleven types of memory exercises.
The elderly outperformed youth in two types of memory. There was no significant
difference by age in five of the tests. Youth held an advantage in only four of the
eleven exercises. Similarly, the perception of danger by the witness is commonly
thought to enhance the ability to remember. The violent, traumatic event is believed
to etch itself on the memory of the witness. However, high levels of stress, including
fear, in fact have the opposite effect. The witness's perception of danger has been
proven to significantly distort or impair perception and recall. See Convis, supra note
50; Johnson, supra note 51; Weihofen, supra note 51.
[Vol. 43:53
EXPERT TESTIMONY
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cross-examination may point
out the brevity of the initial contact, the stress of the event, sugges-
tive influences, and other factors which might influence the ability
to perceive and recall. If, through it all, the witness remains un-
shaken, the fact finder will have little difficulty in concluding that
the accused is guilty. The confidence of lawyers in the effect of such
testimony on jurors is well placed. One study found that almost
eighty percent of all jurors concluded a witness had correctly identi-
fied the culprit. Unfortunately, the percentage did not significantly
vary when the witness identified the wrong person." This occurs be-
cause jurors rely primarily upon the confidence displayed by the
witness in assessing the accuracy of the identification. Witness confi-
dence, however, bears no relation to witness accuracy. 5 Such find-
ings do not fit well within a system of justice dedicated to the pro-
position that it is better to acquit the guilty than risk convicting an
innocent person. The suggestion that our faith in the jury's ability
to divine truth is misplaced can also be deeply disturbing to our
professional self-esteem.
However discomforting the conclusions, the law has sought better
solutions." Some address the inherent limitations in a jury's ability
54. Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on
Human Performance in Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw &
Ht.m BFHAV. 275, 277-78 (1980) (citing Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, Accuracy, Confi-
dence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Testimony, 64 J. APLmrD PSYCHOLOGY
440 (1979)).
The experiments of the behavioral scientists have, however, shown that the per-
centage of witnesses who, in good faith, wrongly identify an innocent person range
from only 15% up to 85%. The studies also show that jurors are singularly inept in
distinguishing between an accurate and inaccurate identification by witnese3 acting
in good faith, finding that from 58% to 73% of jurors will believe a witness who
incorrectly identifies an innocent person.
These conclusions are startling. If there is only one eyewitness available, that wit-
ness is likely to "identify" an innocent person two out of three times. If the witness
appears confident on the stand, the innocent defendant's fate wiln hinge upon the
deliberation of a jury where eight of the twelve jurors believe the witnes made no
mistake in identifying the defendant. For additional research by the behavioral scien-
tists on eyewitness identification, see the 33 recent studies collected in Hoffheimer,
Requiring Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence at Federal Crim-
inal Trials, 80 J. Cinu L & CPMNOLOGY 585, 587-88, n.6 (1989). See also Kassin,
Reddy, & Tulloch, Juror Interpretations of Ambiguous Evidence: The Need for Cog-
nition, Presentation Order, and Persuasion, 14 LAw & Hum. BmuAv. 43 (1990) (video-
taped confessions as evidence).
55. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can we infer anything
about relationship?, 4 LAw & Hus. BmiAv. 243 (1980).
56. The growing judicial unease concerning the disparity between lay assumptions
that eyewitness testimony is accurate and the contradictory scientific evidence has
led to a growing number of cases affirming or mandating admission of expert testi-
mony on this aspect of credibility.
[E]mpirical studies of the psychological factors affecting eyewitness identi-
fication have proliferated, and reports of their results have appeared at an
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to accomplish the task by seeking a replacement device. The twenti-
eth century has witnessed a clash between science and religion.
Under the circumstances it is ironic, if inevitable, that most efforts
to replace the jury offer the modem substitute for divine omnis-
cience: science. "Truth" serums, lie detectors, hypnotism, and a host
of other methods have been advanced as better means of distin-
guishing the honest from the dishonest. So far, science has been un-
able to offer a demonstrably reliable replacement for the jury as
truth finder.
Most of these methods seek ways to improve the jury's ability to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses. The achievements of science
are also offered as aids to the jury in its pursuit of truth. Here sci-
ence has achieved some verifiable progress. This is particularly true
in the collection, preservation, and rigorous scrutiny of tangible evi-
dence. The reception of such aids by the legal profession has been
less hostile. The sheer logic, predictability, and verifiable nature of
newtonian physics have made the admission of evidence from the
"hard" sciences a legal commonplace. 57 Such evidence is, however,
largely accepted only as a cross-check on human perception and
memory. The human psyche and its role in the process remained in
the realm of those mysteries which only the jury could divine. The
behavioral sciences were unwanted interlopers, which might destroy
our faith in the magic.
II. THE FEDERAL RULES
When Professor Mtinsterberg concluded the legal profession was
unlikely to ever accept expert evidence on credibility, he rested his
hopes for change on an appeal to the public.58 Dean Wigmore sug-
gested change was likely to come from a more direct route: legisla-
ever-accelerating pace in the professional literature of the behavioral and
social sciences. . . . The consistency of the results of these studies is im-
pressive, and the courts can no longer remain oblivious to their implications
for the administration of justice.
People v. MacDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 364-65, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 245, 690 P.2d 709, 718
(1984).
57. This reliance is occasionally misplaced. Courts and the bar for years accepted
the paraffin test as conclusive proof that an individual had fired a gun. This is no
longer the case. Similarly, forensic laboratories widely adopted a new technique for
typing blood (protein gel electrophoresis). The results were routinely admitted for
over five years. Then, beginning in the mid-1980s, serious doubts were raised about
the accuracy of the technique. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and
Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45, 47-48 (1989) (ana-
lyzing three methods of typing human DNA from the viewpoint of admissibility and
evaluation of the weight to be given the test results). See also Note, The Dark Side of
DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42
STAN. L. Ray. 465 (1990) (discussion of cases questioning the validity of DNA profiling
as a method of identification).
58. H. MONSTERBERG, ON THE WrrNEss STAND, 10-12 (1908).
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tion.59 Dean Wigmore's suggestion proved prophetic: in 1975, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Seven decades into the
century Professor Wigmore thought would see the acceptance of ex-
pert testimony on credibility, the Federal Rules of Evidence seemed
to finally clear the way.
Rule 702. Testimony By Experts. If scientific ... knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to... determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert... may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise. 0
Rule 703. Basis of Opinion Testimony By Experts. The facts
or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference... [i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by ex-
perts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence."1
Rule 704. Opinion On Ultimate Issue.
(a) ... [T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference other-
wise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ulti-
mate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.02
The Federal Rules of Evidence contemplated admission of expert
testimony if the testimony met three tests: (1) Is the underlying sci-
ence or theory valid?; (2) Is the witness an expert?; and (3) Is the
opinion helpful to the jury? The federal advisory committee's notes
to Rule 704 suggest a fourth criteria, imported from Rule 403: Does
the probative value of the opinion justify the time necessary to put
it into evidence? 3 None of these tests would operate as a per se
exclusion of expert testimony on credibility. Rule 704 eliminated the
last obstacle. Expert testimony was admissible, even if it went to the
ultimate issue. Nothing in the rules suggested that expert testimony
on credibility issues would be treated differently than expert testi-
59. J. WIMOR, A STUDENTs' TExTBooK OF THE LAw oF EvxmNscn § 127 (1935).
60. M.R Evid. 702 and FED. 1. Evm. 702 are identical
61. MR. Evid. 703 and FED. . Evm. 703 are identical.
62. FED. I. Evm. 704(a). The original text of FED. F. Evm. 704 is now contained in
FED. R Evm. 704(a). In October, 1984, Congress passed the so-called Hinckley
amendment adding paragraph (b) to FED. . Evm. 704. The amendment specifically
excluded expert opinions as to whether or not the defendant in a criminal case had
the "mental state or condition constituting any element of the crime... or of a
defense .... " Many states, including Maine, have not adopted a similar exception.
M.R Evid. 704 is identical to FED. P. Evm. 704(a).
63. "The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to ad-
mit all opinions.. . . Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time."
FED. P, EvID. 704 advisory committee's note. The advisory committee did not include
exclusion of evidence the probative value of which was "substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice." It is probable this omission was intentional. M e-.
Field and Murray, however, suggest an opposite assumption, although the Maine ad-
viser used similar language in commenting upon Maine's adoption of Rule 704. See IL
FIELD & P. MuRRAy, MAreS EvmEacE 281-82 (2d ed. 1987). Twenty-four other states
adopted the original federal version of Rule 704 without change. 3 J. WNusTniN & M.
BERGEm WhmsImNm's EVIDENCE 1 704[04] (1988 & Supp. 1989).
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mony on any other subject.
Judicial reluctance or no, it seemed Congress had finally opened
the door to admit the insights of the behavioral sciences on percep-
tion, memory, and communication into the courtroom. Changes
which Dean Wigmore and others had been unable to achieve
through years of persuasion, Congress had done in a single stroke.
State legislatures and courts followed the federal lead. Over two-
thirds of the states adopted rules of evidence paralleling the Federal
Rules of Evidence."
Appellate courts, however, have continued to affirm, and even
mandate, exclusion of expert testimony on credibility, generating an
impressive list of arguments supporting their decisions. These in-
clude: (1) The scientific method used is suspect; (2) The proffered
witness is not an expert; (3) The "common sense" understanding of
the jury is sufficient; (4) The "waste of time" spent on a "collateral
issue" is unnecessary; and (5) The point addressed by the expert
was adequately established by other evidence. These five grounds
correspond to criteria established by the Rules of Evidence. They
apply to all expert testimony. Courts have, however, applied these
criteria differently when the subject of the testimony is credibility.
Furthermore, although neither the rules nor the commentary sug-
gest expert testimony on credibility is subject to any additional cri-
teria for admission, courts have continued to exclude such evidence
on other grounds. These additional grounds include: (6) The testi-
mony invades the province of the jury; (7) The jurors will be so im-
pressed by the expert, they will abdicate their duty as finders of
fact; (8) The testimony is unfairly surprising; and (9) The court
should avoid a battle of the experts.65 In State v. Woodburn,"5 the
Maine Law Court added a new ground: (10) It is inadmissible char-
acter evidence.
There are, of course, a number of decisions which have found
opinion testimony on credibility issues admissible. Finding a
"golden thread" weaving the decisions for and against admission
64. See Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year Per-
spective, 30 VmL. L. REv. 1315, 1349-54 (1985), for a survey and discussion of the
Rules of Evidence as creatures of statute or the court's rulemaking powers. In either
case the courts are bound to follow the spirit and letter of the rules as enacted or
promulgated.
65. For general surveys of decisions excluding expert testimony on credibility
both before and after adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Convis, supra
note 50; Ingulli, Trial by Jury: Reflections on Witness Credibility, Expert Testi-
mony, and Recantation, 20 VAL. U. L. Rav. 145 (1986); and Feeney, Expert Psycho-
logical Testimony on Credibility Issues, 115 Mm. L. REv. 121 (1987). Expert testi-
mony has been excluded on other grounds which do not address the issue directly,
e.g., any error in excluding the evidence was harmless, or the proponent failed to
make a sufficient offer of proof. See also United States v. Earley, 505 F. Supp. 117
(S.D. Iowa 1981) (credibility is not a fact in issue).
66. 559 A.2d 343 (Me. 1989).
[Vol. 43:53
EXPERT TESTIMONY
into a coherent whole has proved difficult. There are several reasons
for this, not the least of which is the paradoxical combination of the
legal profession's need to believe in the jury's magic, and its ten-
dency to depreciate the jurors' individual and collective abilities.
A. Admission of Expert Testimony on Credibility Under the
Rules of Evidence
1. Is the Underlying Science Vali? 0 7
The trial of Galileo offers a unique perspective on the institutional
distrust of the sciences:
So, on 12 April 1633, Galileo was brought into [the] room, sat at
[the] table, and answered the questions from the Inquisitor. The
questions were addressed to him courteously in the intellectual at-
mosphere which reigned in the Inquisition-in Latin, in the third
person. How was he brought to Rome? Is this his book? How did
he come to write it? What is in his book?...
The court did not meet again; the trial ended here, to our sur-
prise. That is to say, Galileo was twice more brought into [the]
room and allowed to testify on his own behalf; but no questions
were asked of him. The verdict was reached at a meeting of the
Congregation of the Holy Office ... which laid down absolutely
what was to be done. The dissident scientist was to be humiliated;
authority was to be shown large not only in action but in intention.
Galileo was to retract; and he was to be shown the instruments of
torture as if they were to be used.
Galileo was not tortured. He was only threatened with torture,
twice. His imagination could do the rest. That was the object of the
trial, to show men of imagination that they were not immune from
the process ... "
Judicial attempts to determine the validity of scientific knowledge
have always been fraught with peril. Yet it is an unavoidable task if
our system of justice is to avail itself of knowledge and skills beyond
the scope of common knowledge. Depriving the jury of access to
valid knowledge is not the only risk. Charlatans and quacks earn
healthy livings purveying plausible pseudo-science. Clearly non-
science should be excluded. But how is a judge to determine the
validity of a field of scientific knowledge? It is improbable that the
judge has any expertise in the expert's field.
67. Logically, the validity of the underlying science should be considered before
addressing the qualification of the individual claiming expertise within the science.
Courts, however, normally consider the issues in reverse order. This occurs because
the court is usually willing to accept, at least provisionally, the proposition that there
is a valid body of knowledge which might be the proper subject of expert testimony.
68. J. BRONowsKL THE AscENT oF Mi 213-16 (1973).
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In the 1923 case of Frye v. United States,6 9 Associate Justice Van
Orsdel offered an answer to the dilemma, in a tour de force of judi-
cial economy. In one paragraph of a two-page opinion he accurately
stated the problem and proposed a solution. Justice Van Orsdel im-
plicitly acknowledged the court's inability to judge the validity of a
scientific theory. He suggested the courts look to those who were
competent.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.70
Justice Van Orsdel's solution came to be known as the Frye test.
It promised considerable time savings by focusing on a single in-
quiry: whether the expert's testimony is based on generally accepted
scientific principles. Trial lawyers and judges alike are enamored of
such a litmus test approach which provides a memorable and less
subjective test of admissibility. Not surprisingly, the Frye test was
widely adopted.
The Frye test was flawed in at least one respect. 1 The exponen-
tial growth of knowledge in the basic sciences rendered the Frye test
inadequate because it prevented the use of newly discovered tech-
nology.72 The law would always lag behind the frontiers of science.
The Maine Law Court recognized these problems in State v. Wil-
liams.73 In Williams the defendant was charged with terrorizing.
The prosecution offered a speech spectrograph, or voice print, analy-
sis identifying the defendant as the maker of a telephoned bomb
threat. Although speech spectrography was not "generally ac-
cepted," the trial justice admitted the evidence. The Law Court af-
firmed, holding that although evidence of "general acceptance"
under the Frye test was sufficient to support admissibility, lack of
"general acceptance" did not preclude admission. The court refused
to adopt the Frye test as the sole basis for admission of expert
testimony.
69. 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
70. Id. at 47, 293 F. at 1014.
71. The ease of application proved increasingly illusory in the decades that fol-
lowed. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977).
72. Application of the Frye test has resulted in exclusion "of such expert evidence
as results of. . . systolic blood pressure tests, spectrographic analysis and a new test
for detecting a lethal dose of succinylcholine chloride." R. FnLD & P. MURRAY, MAINE
EvmENcE 270 (2d ed. 1987) (footnotes omitted).
73. 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
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We believe it would be at odds with the fundamental philosophy of
our Rules of Evidence, as revealed more particularly in Rules 402
and 702, generally favoring the admissibility of expert testimony
whenever it is relevant and can be of assistance to the trier of fact.
As stated in McCormick on Evidence:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for
taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion
for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant
conclusions . . . by a qualified expert witness should be
received unless there are other reasons for exclusion...
In accordance with the provisions, and basic spirit, of our Rules
of Evidence. .. we conclude that there is no justifiable distinction
in principle arising because... expert testimony may happen to
involve newly ascertained or newly applied scientific principles.'
The Williams decision has been widely praised. A growing num-
ber of jurisdictions have adopted its reasoning as a proper modifica-
tion of the venerable Frye test under the approach to admissibility
of expert testimony mandated by the Rules of Evidence.7 5
Determination of scientific validity often becomes entangled in
the paternalistic thread woven through the law of evidence. If the
court's ability to determine the validity of the underlying theory is
limited, how much more limited is that of the lay juror? Judges
should resist the temptation to take the decision from the jury. The
74. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 503-504 (Me. 1978) (citing McCoasazCK ON
EvmnENc § 203 at 491 (2d ed. 1972)). M.R. Evid. 402, Relevant Evidence Generally
Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible, and M.R. Evid. 702, Testimony by Ex-
perts, are identical to their federal counterparts. hmR Evid. 703, Basis of Opinion
Testimony by Experts, is identical to FED. R. EvID. 703. M.R. Evid. 704, Opinion on
Ultimate Issue, is identical to Fan. P. EvwD. 704 as originally enacted. Maine has not
adopted the so-called Hinckley amendment to Rule 704 (excluding opinion testimony
as to whether defendant had the mental state or condition included as an element of
the crime charged). The Maine version of Rule 705, Disclosure of Facts or Data Un-
derlying Expert Opinion, varies from its federal counterpart only by providing that,
upon objection, an expert may be required to state the basis of the opinion before
disclosing the opinion, and in providing that, once the opponent has established a
prima facie case that the opinion is not supported by adequate basis, the proponent
must prove the adequacy of the basis.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3rd Cir. 1985) (the
"spirit" of the Federal Rules suggests abandonment of the Frye test); Fensterer v.
State, 493 A.2d 959, 962 n.3 (Del 1985) (rejecting the Frye test as an independent
controlling standard). The Frye test, however, is still accepted as a prerequisite to
admissibility by some courts. See United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.
1987), affd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 931 (1988). For an alternative approach to
solving the problems raised by the Frye test, see Giannelli, The Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUL
L. REv. 1197, 1245-50 (1980), suggesting that in criminal cases the prosecution be
required to prove the validity of the underlying science beyond a reasonable doubt,
while criminal defendants and civil litigants be held to a preponderance standard. In
all cases the proponent would be free to offer any evidence probative of the issue. See
also United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 US.
1104 (1987).
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risk that the evidence will be more likely to overwhelm twelve jurors
than one judge is minimal. Furthermore, jurors share with judges a
tendency to reject or ignore evidence they do not understand.
The temptation to preempt the jury is particularly strong when
the expert will testify about credibility. Ironically, State v. Wil-
liams76 provides an example. The majority in Williams cast an anx-
ious eye upon the effect of its holding on future admissibility of ex-
pert testimony about credibility. Nearly a quarter century earlier
the court had held polygraph tests inadmissible in State v. Casale,"
noting that lie detectors had not been generally accepted. This was
not the basis of its decision, however. It excluded the lie detector
evidence on the grounds the underlying scientific principle had not
"reached the demonstrable stage.1 87 That is, the results were not
consistently reproducible and predictable. Therefore, the lie detec-
tor failed to meet the primary criteria of scientific proof.19
The courts in Frye,80 Casale, and Williams all understood the is-
sue was scientific certainty. They also understood scientific certainty
ultimately depended upon scientific methods of proof, which re-
quired demonstration." The court in Williams, however, was com-
pelled to reaffirm its decision in Casale, and to offer an additional
rationale supporting the continued exclusion of lie detector
evidence: 82
76. 388 A.2d at 503-504.
77. 150 Me. 310, 320, 110 A.2d 588, 593 (1954).
78. Id. at 319, 110 A.2d at 592 (quoting Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d
597 (1949)) (emphasis added).
79. For a description of the scientific method as applied to the social sciences, sea
Whitford, Lowered Horizons: Implementation Research In a Post-CLS World, 1986
Wis. L. Rav. 755 (1986).
80. Justice Van Orsdel proposed the Frye test as a method of determining when a
scientific proposition crossed from experimental hypothesis to demonstrable
principle.
81. A theory is deemed acceptable if it provides an explanation for known facts or
phenomenon. The theory is considered proven when results predicted from its appli-
cation are consistently reproducible. Justice Van Orsdel's approach suggests a judicial
poll of the scientific community. His reasoning depended upon the inference that
scientists would not extend acceptance to propositions until proven by scientific
methods. Justice Van Orsdel concluded this was the only method of proving scientific
validity.
It was at this point the Maine Law Court took a different path. In both Casale and
Williams the Law Court held "general acceptance" constituted prima facie evidence
of scientific validity, but was not willing to accept the Frye test as the sole means to
determine admissibility. The approach in Casale and Williams is correct. Even in the
Information Age there is an inherent time lag between demonstration amounting to
scientific proof and general acceptance. It is also possible, of course, that generally
accepted principles or techniques may be demonstrably wrong. Finally, exclusive reli-
ance upon the Frye test precludes even the opportunity to establish validity of the
newly discovered truth. It also precludes challenging the scientific commonplace. See
State v. York, 564 A.2d 389, 392-93 (Me. 1989) (Hornby, J., dissenting).
82. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d at 502.
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The reference to a special standard of admissibility in Casale,
however, was occasioned by the peculiarly special nature of lie de-
tector tests as evidence. Lie detector evidence directly and perva-
sively impinges upon that function which is so uniquely the prerog-
ative of the jury as fact-finder: to decide the credibility of
witnesses. The admissibility of lie detector evidence therefore poses
the serious danger that a mechanical device, rather than the judg-
ment of the jury, will decide the credibility. For this reason, it re-
mains questionable whether this Court by its language in Casale
was purporting to establish a specially restrictive standard regard-
ing the admissibility of any type of expert testimony which may
rest on new, or new applications of, scientific principles."
Williams represents a step forward in determining admissibility
of expert testimony. But in preserving a "special standard" for ex-
pert testimony on credibility, the court simultaneously took a step
backward.8 The decision in Woodburn is at least partially a reflec-
tion of that regression. Dr. Sobchuk was a licensed clinical psycholo-
gist. His expertise was not questioned and was expressly accepted by
the trial justice.5 5 There is no indication the court had any reason to
question the personal honesty or professional integrity of Dr.
Sobchuk.
Dr. Sobchuk testified he diagnosed the boy as suffering from a
"medically recognized syndrome," basing his diagnosis on many ses-
sions with the boy and information provided by the Department of
Human Services and his teachers. This type of information is nor-
mally relied on by psychiatrists, psychologists, and physicians in
treating their patients. The state offered no evidence, nor ever sug-
gested the boy did not suffer from a medically recognized syndrome.
The trial court gave no indication it doubted the truth of Dr.
Sobchuk's testimony on these issues.88 Dr. Sobchuk's opinions were
"relevant conclusions which [were] supported by a qualified expert
witness [and which] should [have been] received."8
The Law Court found this foundation insufficient. The doctor was
83. Id. at 502-503 (footnotes and citations omitted).
84. See State v. York, 564 A.2d at 393 (Homby, J., dissenting). The convictions in
York were vacated based upon lack of scientific validity supporting the unobjected-to
admission of testimony by a clinical social worker that the alleged victim exhibited
behaviors consistent with sexual abuse. Justice Homby, joined by Chief Justice McK-
usick, dissented. "[W]ittingly or not, appellate courts are in the process of carving out
a separate and tougher evidentiary rule for expert testimony in areas where they are
skeptical of the science--clinical social work, perhaps the psychology profession or
even the social sciences generally." Id.
85. See supra notes 9-36 and accompanying text.
86. See Transcript, supra note 10, at 321-23 and 351-58. The author has been
informed that the state was prepared to call a psychiatrist in rebuttal, if Dr.
Sobchuk's testimony had been admitted. The record on appeal, however, is as stated.
87. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d at 503 (quoting MCCORMCK ON Evmmicn § 203 at
491 (2d ed. 1972)).
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faulted for not specifying the relevant section of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders I (DSM III). The defense
was faulted for not offering a copy of the DSM III into evidence.
According to the Law Court, the trial justice was justified in con-
cluding he was unable to determine if the doctor's testimony was
based upon a valid theory.8 The trial court, however, made no such
determination. Furthermore, all three points are make-weight
arguments.
Assume the issue was whether the boy suffered from a soft tissue
injury. Assume also that a licensed doctor treated the boy, and was
prepared to testify that the boy suffered from a medically recog-
nized injury. In such a case, any objection based upon a lack of
foundation as to the scientific validity of the diagnosis would have
been given short shrift by the trial court. It is inconceivable that an
appellate court would raise the issue sua sponte. A treating physi-
cian's testimony that the patient suffers from a "medically recog-
nized" condition is a sufficient basis for admission. Such testimony
satisfies the requirements of the Frye test, and meeting the Frye
test is prima facie evidence of the requisite validity. In Woodburn,
the state neither objected nor even suggested that Dr. Sobchuk
based his diagnosis on an invalid theory.89
There is no requirement that a party offer a learned treatise into
evidence to support the unchallenged validity of a licensed physi-
cian's diagnosis. There is no rule of law or evidence requiring a pre-
sumption that the expert witness is lying or mistaken. The propo-
nent is not required to prove the truth of his witness's sworn
testimony by extrinsic evidence.90 In Woodburn, the trial judge did
88. The Law Court majority stated:
Such behavior, [Dr. Sobchuk] opined, demonstrated an "inability to distin-
guish truth from falsehood" which was a "medically recognized syndrome
somewhat akin to" what is listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders III (DSM I) as "conduct disorder, unsocialized ag-
gressive." The DSM I was not introduced into evidence nor was there any
other reference to it by Sobchuk ..
Throughout the extensive voir dire Sobchuk never identified the "medi-
cally recognized syndrome" to which he alluded, other than by the vague
reference that it was "akin to conduct disorder, unsocialized aggressive." He
at no time stated whether the "syndrome" was listed in any DSM ... or
what, if any, were the criteria for its diagnosis. Sobchuk's testimony demon-
strates no scientifically accepted basis for determining that the child was
unable to distinguish truth from falsehood .... Thus, the trial court could
properly determine that the testimony did not meet the requirements of
M.R. Evid. 702 and, therefore, was inadmissible ....
State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d at 345-46.
89. M.R. Evid. 705 provides that the proponent must prove the basis of the expert
opinion, only after the adverse party has made a prima facie showing that the basis Is
inadequate to support the opinion.
90. If anything, the general practice is directly opposite. Rule 403 is invoked to
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not exclude Dr. Sobchuk's testimony out of any concern over the
validity of his diagnosis. The trial judge excluded the evidence be-
cause he felt the doctor's testimony "border[ed] so closely upon...
the ultimate issue as to the credibility of [the boy]."' '
Another level of inquiry by the court is also necessary to deter-
mine the validity of the underlying theory- Does the theory support
the forensic conclusion? The internal pressures of the advocacy pro-
cess can tempt counsel and the expert to stretch a valid theory or
technique to cover a-forensic purpose beyond its intended use. The
issue is not inherently difficult for the court to resolve.02
limit, if not preclude, such evidence.
91. Transcript, supra note 10, at 352. The trial justice felt that M.R. Evid. 704,
Opinion on Ultimate Issue, gave the court discretion to admit or exclude testimony
on an ultimate issue. Id. .R. Evid. 704 is identical to FED. R. EvID. 704. The Law
Court's opinion suggests the trial justice relied "primarily on MR. Evid. 404(b) and
702 and the discretionary power of the court pursuant to Rule 403" in excluding Dr.
Sobchuk's testimony. State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d at 345.
The trial justice indeed mentioned all three rules in his remarks prior to ruling. For
the most part he confined himself to summarizing the content of each rule. The only
reference to any finding which might relate to Rule 702 was his statement that Dr.
Sobchuk's testimony "is, as far as I am concerned, just as consistent with sexual
abuse as not with sexual abuse." Transcript, supra note 10, at 351-52. This suggests
the trial judge concluded Dr. Sobchuk's testimony might be excludable under the
helpfulness requirement of Rule 702. The Law Court did not comment on this im-
plausible conclusion. It chose instead to rely on the separate requirement of Rule 702
that the opinion be based on a valid theory. There is no suggestion the trial court had
any such concern. The trial court's reference to Rule 404(b) related to the doctor's
testimony concerning the numerous lies or fantasies the boy had told him. This teati-
mony was offered on voir dire as a part of the basis of Dr. Sobchuk's opinion. Ulti-
mately the trial justice ruled as quoted in the text.
92. The forensic and scientific use need not always be the same. It is only neces-
sary for the forensic use to be a logical extension of the scientific purpose. An excel-
lent example of this type of analysis can be found in State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154
(Me. 1988). The prosecution introduced evidence of "indicators" or "clinical features"
relied upon by mental health professionals in providing therapy to victims of sexual
abuse. The expert witness testified the alleged victim displayed these indicators. In
the expert's opinion, the alleged victim had been abused by a male adult in a "trust
or authority relationship." Id. at 1157. The Law Court reversed and remanded,
stating.
Neither [the expert's] qualifications nor her methods as a mental health
professional are in question. The record, however, does not support the ad-
missibility of her testimony identifying John as a victim of past sexual
abuse. The validity of the summary of symptoms encountered in the popu-
lation of her patients is seriously impaired by a selection bias. No compari-
son testing was done with children who were not victims of sexual abuse to
determine whether they also demonstrated like indicators. Her testimony
demonstrates no scientific basis for determining that a causal relationship
exists between sexual abuse and the "clinical features of sexual abuse," nor
is there demonstrated even a positive correlation between the two.
Id. Compare People v. Bledsoe, 36 CaL3d 236, 249 n.11, 203 CaLRptr. 450, 459 n.11,
681 P.2d 291, 300 n.l (1984) (suggesting in dicta that evidence of the battered child
syndrome would be admissible because it was "developed in large part to identify
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Reasonable judges may differ about which method is most appro-
priate to determine scientific validity. Whatever method is selected,
it should apply to all expert testimony. There is no justification for
the creation of a "special standard" of reliability for expert testi-
mony about credibility. 3 The Rules of Evidence are sufficient to ex-
clude expert testimony based upon invalid theories. There is no jus-
tification for preventing jurors from considering relevant expert
testimony based upon valid theories, whatever the subject. In cases
where the validity is subject to dispute, doubts should be resolved in
favor of admission. What weight, if any, given such evidence is for
the jury to decide.
2. Is the Witness an Expert?
Determination of whether or not a witness is qualified as an ex-
pert is a question for the court.94 The modern trend has been to-
wards liberality in judicial findings of competency of witnesses.9
Degrees of competency, or expertise, are generally deferred to the
finder of fact as affecting the weight of the testimony.90 The policy
those children whose injuries were intentionally inflicted") and People v. Castro, 144
Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding evidence of DNA profiling
inadmissible based upon a finding that the laboratory techniques used were an inva-
lid application of a valid theory). For a classic case of mystical science and expertise,
see People v. Walker, 69 Cal. App. 475, 231 P. 572 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (Wife acted
as interpreter for her severely "crippled" husband, whose answers were inaudible to
everyone but the wife. His answers were also apparently made without moving the
lips or making any other physical indication he had spoken at all.).
93. See, e.g., Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1978), and State v.
Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (both holding that the Frye test
applied to psychiatric diagnoses as well as to physical scientific evidence).
94. FED. R. EvED. 104(a).
95. In commenting upon the provision of Rule 703 (permitting experts to base
their testimony upon otherwise inadmissible evidence), the federal advisory commit-
tee stated: "In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opin-
ions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice into
line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court." FED, R EviD. 703
advisory committee's note. See also 3 D. LouisELL & C. MUEILER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 381 (1979 & Supp. 1989) and 2 J. WiGmoRE, EViDENCE iN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§
501 (policy of abolishing disqualifications through mental derangement) and 509 (pol-
icy of abolishing disqualification by infancy) (rev. ed. 1979), for Dean Wigmore's ar-
guments supporting a general policy of restricting judicial exclusion of witnesses on
competency grounds.
96. Determination of an expert's qualifications and the competency of a lay wit-
ness are directly analogous. The discussion of the latter in Dean Wigmore's treatise is
helpful:
(c) The preliminary determination of capacity is for the judge, not the
jury ... ; the jury has nothing to do with preliminary questions of admissi-
bility. But, after the court has passed on the witness' capacity, it is still
open to the jury to conclude that the witness is not credible and to reject
the testimony entirely; and the court's decision does not necessarily affect
the estimate which the jury must make.
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toward more liberal findings of competence springs from an underly-
ing change in attitude towards juries.
The law of evidence began to emerge in the late seventeenth cen-
tury. The jury had evolved from a body of witnesses to a fact-finding
body having no pre-existing knowledge of the case. This change oc-
curred in the context of an English society highly structured along
class lines. Judges and barristers were members of the upper class.0
In time, service on juries expanded downward through the social
structure. Individuals considered less than peers by court and coun-
sel were called to serve as jurors. The upper class doubted the abil-
ity of such people to decide cases justly based upon the dispassion-
ate dictates of rational analysis and the law.08 This led to a
paternalistic desire to protect jurors from evidentiary influences ex-
ceeding their limited abilities and rationality. The law of evidence
was at least partially the result of these social preconceptions. The
paternalistic theme in the developing law of evidence survived trans-
2 J. WGMORE, EVmENCE iN TRALS AT COmsON LAW § 497(c) (footnote in originah
"Saucier v. State, 156 Tex.Crim. 301, 235 S.W.2d 903 (1950) (having ruled the witness
competent, the court erroneously excluded evidence of insanity to impeach him)'
(rev. ed. 1979).
97. Will and Ariel Durant give the following description of English society at the
beginning of the 19th century.
Many unnatural inequalities remained. The concentration of wealth was
unusually high. Equality before the law was nullified by the cost of ltiga-
tion. Accused lords could be tried only by the House of Lords (a jury of
their peers); this "privilege of peerage" survived till 1841. Careless men of
no pedigree might be forcibly impressed into the Navy. Commoners rarely
reached high office in the Navy or the Army, in the civil service, the univer-
sities, or the law. A ruling class of nobles and gentry seldom allowed to the
undistinguished mass any share in determining the personnel or policies of
the government.
So till 1832, the nobility was supreme, and smiled at its challengers.
11 W. & A. DuRAiN. Tan SToRY op CnUM7xzON: THE AGE OF NAPOLEON 352-53 (1975).
98. So pervasive was the class structure, it influenced even the most virulent disci-
ples of the English Enlightenment. Prior to devoting his energy exclusively to poetry,
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1794) was a political lecturer and magazine editor.
[Coleridge] spoke as a bridge-burning radical against the war [with revolu-
tionary France], slavery, shackling of the press, and especially against sales
taxes as falling cruelly upon the common man. But he did not recommend
universal adult suffrage, male or female. "We should be bold in the avowal
of political truth among those only whose minds are susceptible of reason-
ing, and never to the multitude, who, ignorant and needy, must necessarily
act from the impulse of inflamed passions."
Id. at 426 (quoting P. WHIz PoLmcAL TRACTS oF WoRDswoava. COL=DGE, SHEL-
EY xxxii (1953) (footnotes omitted)). The degree of trust extended jurors by the legal
profession was typified by its regulation of the deliberation process. Deliberation was
the one time the jurors escaped the direct scrutiny and control of their betters. "In
trials the jurors... retired to an adjoining room, where, 'in order to avoid intemper-
ance and causeless delay,' they were kept without meat, drink, fire, or candle... 'till
they were unanimously agreed."' Id. at 356 (quoting BLACKSroN IN Hm.Evy 101).
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plantation to North America. Notwithstanding our egalitarian self-
image, the elite of the modern American meritocracy also tends to
anoint itself with the chrism of innate superiority.
The law of evidence is still permeated by the paternalism of its
origins. Though it may be less obvious than it once was, professional
condescension towards the lay juror still exists. It finds expression in
many of the rules and their application. Even our professional peers
from other fields are not exempt: psychiatrists and psychologists are
particularly subject to skepticism. If the expert is accepted as a pro-
fessional peer, the paternalistic focus shifts back to the jurors and a
concern that they may be overwhelmed by the obvious superiority of
the expert.
The Woodburn case 9 provides an example of the tension which
still exists. There is an indication that the majority questioned Dr.
Sobchuk's qualifications. The dissent responded:
I do not agree with the Court's faulting of Dr. Sobchuk's testi-
mony ... for what is basically an inadequate foundation-i.e. that
the defense did not qualify Dr. Sobchuk to give the opinion sought.
Here, the State made no objection on this ground at trial and the
trial court made a clear finding that Dr. Sobchuk was qualified.
Rule 702, though mentioned in passing, was not the basis for the
trial court's ruling excluding this testimony, the transcript demon-
strates that neither trial counsel nor the trial court considered it to
be an issue, and the defendant therefore never had reason to beef
up his proffer. 100
Better judgment prevailed among those responsible for the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. Whatever the limitations of individual ju-
rors, the jury is no longer assumed to be collectively as ignorant,
uneducable, gullible, irrational, or subject to the tides of passion as
was once taken for granted. Testimony establishing that a witness
has the requisite professional degree or license constitutes prima fa-
cie evidence that the witness is qualified to testify as an expert.10 1
Thereafter, it is the opponent's obligation to produce evidence re-
butting the inference of competency. Absent clear evidence of in-
competency, the issue becomes one of credibility for the jury. The
doctor may speak but only the jury can decide whether it will listen.
The question remains: Which expert is competent to determine
the credibility of another person? The answer lies in Rule 703. This
99. State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343 (Me. 1989).
100. Id. at 347. The majority opinion only notes that the state failed to object to
Dr. Sobchuk's "qualifications as an expert." Id. at 345 n.1. Given the absence of a
direct challenge to Dr. Sobchuk's qualifications in the opinion, it appears the majority
ultimately agreed with Justice Hornby on this point See also State v. York, 564 A.2d
389 (Me. 1989) (holding it was error to admit expert testimony because the underly-
ing scientific theory was invalid as a matter of law, even though the opponent did not
challenge the validity at trial) (Hornby, J., joined by McKusick, C.J., dissenting).
101. 3 D. LouisELu & C. MuwLLE FEDERAL EvMENcE § 381 (1979 & Supp. 1989).
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rule permits experts to base their testimony on facts inadmissible in
evidence "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.
.. "102 The advisory committee's notes make it clear the rule was
specifically intended to include resolution of the competency issue.
[The rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions be-
yond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring judicial prac-
tice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not
in court. Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis
on information from numerous sources ... including statements
by patients and relatives .... The physician makes life-and-death
decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, expertly per-
formed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judi-
cial purposes.103
Rule 703 adopts the respective discipline's decision about what
should be relied on in forming opinions within the field. Rule 703
also adopts the discipline's methods of assessing the validity of that
basis. The law is not the only profession faced with the need to as-
sess otherwise unverifiable statements by lay persons. Where rou-
tinely used within another field, the expert's judgment about the ve-
racity of such statements will also be accepted by the law as worthy
of submission to the jury for evaluation. There are two foundational
prerequisites. First, the assessment of credibility must be reasonably
necessary to the field of expertise. Second, the expert's profession
must assume that competent practitioners are able to assess accu-
racy to an appropriate degree. If these criteria are met, the expert is
deemed competent to assess credibility.'"
Psychiatrists and psychologists are competent to diagnose mental
illness or impairment. Diagnosis is based to some extent upon the
assessment of the history given by the patient. This requires the
doctor to assess the patient's credibility. The experimental arm of
the behavioral sciences also requires credibility assessments, devot-
ing much of its study to discovering the extent and causes of error
and distortion in human perception, recall, and communication. The
sciences rely on the doctor's ability to assess credibility. The Federal
Rules of Evidence find that reliance sufficient.105
This is not as revolutionary as it may first appear. Consider some-
thing as prosaic as the soft tissue whiplash case. The treating physi-
102. FED. R. EvD. 703.
103. FED. R. Evro. 703 advisory committee's note (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
104. This approach borrows from the same wisdom underlying the court's decision
in Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923), discussed supra note3
69-91 and accompanying text.
105. See also the discussion infra text accompanying notes 146-48, about the aim-
ilarities and distinctions between the pursuit of truth by the court and by the clinical
psychologist or psychiatrist.
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cian is called to testify about the fact, nature, and extent of the al-
leged injury. Most doctors will admit medicine has no objective test
capable of verifying the injury. Certainly no test has been found to
objectively measure pain.106 Diagnosis depends entirely upon the
doctor's subjective interpretation of the patient's subjective com-
plaints. Such testimony is admitted routinely. The essence of such
cases is plaintiff's testimony concerning neck pain after the accident.
The primary purpose of calling the doctor is to provide expert testi-
mony supporting that testimony.10 7 In fact, the opinion is nothing
more than that the doctor believes the patient's complaints of pain
and stiffness. The sole issue is the patient/plaintiff's truthfulness.
On cross-examination, defense counsel routinely establishes the
distinction between objective and subjective findings. Defense coun-
sel establishes the subjective basis of the diagnosis. The doctor is
asked: "Have you ever been fooled by a patient?" The answer is
almost always: "Yes."""8
On redirect examination, plaintiff's counsel asks if it is unusual
for a diagnosis to be based upon subjective complaints. The answer
is always: "No." Typically, the next question is: "Do you attempt to
determine the accuracy of subjective complaints by patients?" An-
swer: "Yes." This question is usually followed by a discussion of
guarding, 09 range of motion, and observation of the patient's move-
ments. Finally, plaintiff's counsel asks one or all of the following
questions: "Having considered all the points raised by the defense
lawyer, do you see any reason to change your diagnosis?" "Did you
ever notice anything about the plaintiff which gave you cause to
doubt the plaintiff suffered an injury and was continuing to experi-
ence pain?" "Did you ever have any reason to doubt the accuracy of
plaintiff's complaints?"
The foregoing minuet is so routine it rarely draws an objection
106. Thermography is currently being offered for this purpose. The technique
consists of taking photographs of the patient with film sensitive to differences in skin
temperature. The theory is that the human body has a left-right symmetry. It is pre-
sumed the skin temperature of corresponding parts of the body should be the same,
absent injury or disease. "Advocates say thermography takes 'pictures of pain'. ...
Critics claim thermograms aren't reliable because they often show signs of injury
where none exists or fail to detect an injury.... Courts have ruled both ways." Wall
St. J., June 5, 1990, at B1, col. 1.
107. Generally the only other purposes for calling the treating physician are to lay
a foundation for the medical bills and to suggest a prognosis. The former requires a
foundation including the necessity of the treatment, which depends upon the exis-
tence, nature, and extent of the injury. The prognosis assumes the injury exists in the
first place. Both depend upon the veracity of the plaintiff's complaints.
108. Defense counsel have even been known to shift the focus from falsehood to
possible error by briefly inquiring into the subject of psychosomatic complaints.
109. Alteration of normal movement or behavior adopted by an individual to
avoid discomfort.
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from either side.110 If either counsel were to call the doctor for the
avowed purpose of giving an opinion about the truth or falsity of
plaintiff's testimony, the result is likely to be dramatically different.
Yet there is no legal basis for a different outcome. The Rules of Evi-
dence contain no provision providing a different rule for experts
called to testify on credibility issues. It is possible that the expert is
relying upon undetected error or falsehood. Cross-examination
should establish and explore that possibility. The expert's testimony
is submitted to the jurors for consideration. The jurors will give it
whatever weight they decide is warranted.
Specialization within the field can also raise problems in deter-
mining an expert's competency. Generally, the expert need not be
found a specialist within the subject area in order to qualify.' A
note of caution is warranted, however. The law has only recently
embraced specialization. Medicine and psychology have a longer ex-
perience in the development and recognition of specialties. The sub-
ject matter of the testimony may nonetheless be beyond the exper-
tise of a licensed practitioner. For example, a court may reject
testimony about the dynamics of eyewitness identification by a
clinical psychiatrist. Similarly, an experimental psychologist special-
izing in the study of memory might not be competent to diagnose
schizophrenia.
It is appropriate for the court to consider the limits of the prof-
fered expert's specialty, and to determine if the testimony concerns
matters beyond that specialty. Such inquiries must be done care-
fully. Expert testimony often draws upon a mixture of the scientific
commonplace and highly specialized aspects of the field. In most
cases, however, questions about the witness's expertise go to the
weight to be given the testimony. The court's function is to make
only a threshold determination. The decision is analogous to the
judge's role in deciding motions for directed verdicts. The question
is not whether the witness is the best qualified expert available, nor
is it whether the judge agrees with the witness's conclusions. There
is only one issue: Has the proponent made a prima facie showing
that the proffered testimony is based on some "scientific, technical
110. The admission of such testimony is not confined to soft tissue injuries. The
diagnoses of psychiatrists and psychologists generally fall within this category. Nor is
the phenomenon limited to the field of medicine. Accident reconstructionists often
base their opinions in part upon statements of witnesses as to start positions, angles
of approach, and so on. Economists projecting lost income also depend upon subjec-
tive information. Other examples abound. See, e.g., Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VANw.
L Rv. 414, 417-18 (1952).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Vigla, 549 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied,
553 F.2d 101 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 434 U.S. 834 (1977) (expert with degrees in
medicine and pharmacy allowed to testify concerning obesity); Holmgren v. Massy-
Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1975) (expert in engineering mechanics allowed
to testify concerning design of farm machinery).
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or other specialized knowledge"? 112 Only in the clearest of cases
should the expert be excluded for lack of credentials or experience
in a recognized specialty.
3. Will the Expert Testimony Help the Jury?
"Whether the situation is a proper one for use of expert testimony
is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier. . . When
opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore
superfluous and a waste of time.11' This inquiry was intended by
the drafters of the Rules to be the central focus of questions con-
cerning admissibility of expert testimony. Will the testimony help
the jury?1 1 ' Courts have found a bewildering complexity hidden
within this simple question, particularly when the subject is expert
testimony about the credibility of another witness. There is, how-
ever, some merit in first examining the easy case.
The least disputed type of expert testimony is that based upon
examination of tangible evidence. Expert testimony may enhance
the jury's ability to perceive or understand the significance of tangi-
ble evidence.115 This evidence is admissible even if it directly contra-
dicts the testimony of another witness. Examples are commonplace,
The authenticity of a document or signature is a frequent issue of
disputed fact. Jurors are permitted to form their own judgments as
to the genuineness of handwriting.110 Notwithstanding this, both lay
and expert witnesses are permitted to give their opinions on the
subject.1 7 The rationale is straightforward. The lay opinion is ad-
missible because the witness's greater familiarity with the handwrit-
ing may help the jury. The expert may be able to detect subtle con-
gruencies or discrepancies which are imperceptible to the lay juror.
This commonplace has another dimension bearing on our inquiry.
Lay witnesses are permitted to express their opinion as to the au-
thenticity of handwriting. The handwriting expert's testimony may
directly contradict the testimony of lay witnesses in several ways: It
may contradict the opinion testimony of a lay witness that she rec-
ognizes the handwriting as that of another; it may contradict the
testimony of witnesses who state they saw a particular individual
write or sign the document in question; and it may even contradict
the testimony of another witness that he did not sign the document.
112. FED. R. Evw. 702.
113. FED. R. Evm. 702 advisory committee's note (citing 7 J. WIoMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRALS AT COMMON LAw § 1918 (rev. ed. 1979)).
114. Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 722 F.2d 1134, 1139 (3d Cir. 1983) ("help-
fulness" is the touchstone of FED. R. Evm. 702).
115. X-rays, microscopic examination, chemical analysis, and many other tech-
niques enhance human perceptual acuity, permitting the jury to see what is otherwise
beyond the reach of their senses.
116. FED. R. Evm. 901(b)(3).
117. FEn. R. Evm. 901(b)(2).
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In the last two circumstances, the expert's testimony is a direct as-
sault upon the credibility of other witnesses. Yet it is admissible be-
cause it may help the jurors assess the credibility of the other
witness.
Another example may be found in United States v. Alexander.'0
The defendant in that case was accused of having robbed a bank.
Bank surveillance photos were admitted into evidence. The govern-
ment called three bank employees who identified Dr. Alexander as
the man in the photographs. The government also called four ac-
quaintances of the defendant, who testified that they believed the
person in the surveillance photographs was the defendant.
The defendant denied having robbed the bank, claiming a case of
mistaken identity. The defendant produced five witnesses who testi-
fied that the person in the photographs was not the defendant. The
defendant also called two expert witnesses: One an orthodontist who
specialized in cephalometrics (the scientific measurement of the
dimensions of the human head); the other a former F.B.I. agent ex-
pert in photographic comparisons.1 9 Both would have testified that
the defendant could not be the person in the surveillance photo-
graphs. The trial judge excluded the testimony of both defense ex-
perts because "the jury was able to make the necessary photographic
comparisons without the aid of expert witnesses."11 0
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding it "unlikely that any of the
jurors were sufficiently informed about cephalometry to undertake
this type of comparison without expert assistance." ' 1 The court also
held it was error to exclude the former F.B.I. agent's testimony con-
cerning distortion in pictures taken by the surveillance camera. Such
testimony would "have aided the jury in visually comparing the
photos."' 22
The Fifth Circuit was aware that the expert testimony was an in-
direct assault on the credibility of no less than seven witnesses
called by the government, and would also have bolstered the credi-
bility of the defendant and his five lay witnesses. The court, how-
ever, noted the absurdity of excluding the expert testimony, even
though it tended to rebut lay opinions of those acquaintances who
viewed the surveillance photographs. It apparently did not occur to
the court that all eyewitness identifications are lay opinion
testimony.
As in so many cases on this issue, the opinion in Alexander evi-
dences an unarticulated unease about admitting expert testimony on
credibility. The court took considerable pains to point out that such
118. 816 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1110 (1990).
119. Id. at 167.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 168.
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testimony would not be admissible in every case. 23 The factors
identified by the court as separating Alexander from the ordinary
case are instructive. The Fifth Circuit noted the government's case
emphasized irrelevant personal traits of the defendant.124 The F.B.I.
investigation failed to uncover any physical evidence connecting the
defendant with the crime.1 25 The court found Alexander distinguish-
able from other cases where expert testimony on credibility might
be offered because of the relative weakness of the government's case.
The implication is that the defendant would not be permitted to call
witnesses attacking the credibility of the prosecution witnesses if the
government had a stronger case. This approach is wrong. The rela-
tive strength of the opponent's case has no logical relevancy to the
admissibility of the proponent's evidence.
1 20
The outcome in Alexander was correct. The witnesses were expert
within fields of specialized knowledge who based their opinions upon
valid scientific theories. Their testimony might help the jurors de-
cide at least two issues: the jury had to assess the credibility of the
witnesses expressing their opinions about the identity of the bank
robber, and the jurors also had to make their own direct comparison
of the photographs with the defendant's appearance. The phrase
"might help" is important. The focus of the Rules of Evidence is to
provide the jury with any information which may assist them in
finding the truth. This includes both information which may assist
them in weighing the evidence and the benefit of special skill or ex-
pertise applied directly to evaluating the credibility of other evi-
dence. The decision, however, remains with the jury. The Rules an-
ticipate exclusion of expert testimony where such testimony is
superfluous or within the common knowledge of the jury. The con-
cern is one of judicial economy, not the integrity of the system. Ju-
rors may ignore or reject the expert's testimony. They may even ac-
cept and consider it, but still reach an opposite conclusion.127
Once the subject of the proffered testimony departs from exami-
nation or analysis of hard evidence, the courts are even more reluc-
123. Id.
124. The Fifth Circuit stated that the prosecution's case "mainly consisted of an
in-depth recitation of [the defendant's] sloppy bookkeeping ... and his habit of vis-
iting night clubs featuring exotic dancers." Id. at 169 n.5. By contrast, the court In
the first sentence of the opinion noted that the defendant was a physician and re-
ferred to him as "Dr. Alexander" throughout.
125. Id.
126. Such an approach suggests that the trial court should first determine the
correct outcome of the trial. Expert testimony on credibility is to be admitted only
when it will help the jury reach the correct decision. Such an approach is a judicial
preemption of the parties' right to have fact issues decided by a jury.
127. This is what apparently happened on remand. The jury in Dr. Alexander's
second trial found him guilty. See United States v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 808 (5th Cir.
1989).
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tant to admit expert testimony on credibility. At this point, the judi-
cial focus tends to shift. The inquiry is no longer a straightforward
analysis of whether or not the testimony may assist the jury. Courts
instead tend to fixate on the fact to be determined. Many courts
approach the issue as if expert testimony on credibility is subject to
special rules of admissibility. There is no basis for this supposition
in the Rules of Evidence, nor is there any basis in logic.
Whatever the reason for this phenomenon, there is little doubt it
exists. The pre-occupation with expert testimony on credibility as a
substantively distinct type of evidence has resulted in the prolifera-
tion of collateral issues.
Much of the confusion in this area of the law arises because the
witnesses and courts are often speaking at cross purposes, both ap-
proaching the testimony from the often disparate analytical ap-
proach of their respective disciplines. The behavioral sciences have
come to understand that the ability to perceive, recall, and commu-
nicate accurately varies widely between individuals, depending upon
such influences as the effect of any mental or emotional disfunction,
the effect of extraordinary experiences or circumstances, and the in-
dividual's developmental age, intelligence, training, and, perhaps,
the individual's personality. The expert witnesses formulate their
opinions within a conceptual matrix based on the insights and objec-
tives of their own disciplines. 12 8
128. The problems with psychiatric expert testimony are not entirely due to the
courts' struggle with evidentiary problems. Dr. Binger testified for the defense in the
trial of Alger Hiss. He was subjected to an effective cross-examination:
Binger on direct examination had pointed out Chambers' untidiness, and
on cross-examination he was made to acknowledge that the trait was found
in such persons as Albert Einstein ... Will Rogers,... Bing Crosby, and
Thomas Edison. Binger testified that Chambers habitually gazed at the
ceiling while testifying and seemed to have no direct relation with his ex-
aminer. The prosecutor in a turnabout told Binger "We have made a count
of the number of times you looked at the ceiling. During the first ten min-
utes you looked at the ceiling nineteen times; in the next fifteen minutes
you looked up twenty times, for the next fifteen minutes ten times, and for
the last fifteen minutes ten times more. We counted a total of fifty-nine
times that you looked at the ceiling in fifty minutes. Now I was wondering
whether that was any symptom of a psychopathic personality?" Shifting
uneasily in the witness chair, Binger replied, "Not alone." Binger had testi-
fied that stealing was a psychopathic symptom and the prosecutor asked
him. "Did you ever take a hotel towel or Pullman towel?" Binger replied, "I
can't swear whether I did or not, I don't think so." The prosecutor there-
upon asked: "And if any member of this jury had stolen a towel, would that
be evidence of a psychopathic personality?"
R SLOvWKO, PSYCMATRY AND LAw 45-46 (1973). Dr. Binger's experience left a lasting
impression. Fifteen years after the experience he remarked
Many of my psychiatric friends agreed with me in this [diagnosis], but were
less willing to expose themselves to ridicule and contumely than I was. Per-
haps they were wiser. ... I know that [the prosecutor's questioning] is all
part of the game, but it seemed to me shocking and preposterous. I had
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Courts, on the other hand, use several distinct conceptual ma-
trixes to analyze the proffered testimony. Traditional legal analysis
divides credibility issues into two main categories: falsehood and er-
ror. Several other abstract classifications are commonly raised which
are found both within and outside this traditional division. Some are
suggested by traditional legal methodology. Others are drawn from
the courts' understanding of human nature. For example, it has long
been accepted that error may occur within perception, memory, or
communication. Similarly, courts have distinguished between ge-
neric testimony on credibility, testimony about the credibility of a
particular individual, and testimony relating to specific statements
by a witness. Courts have recognized the problem resulting from
these disparate approaches, and have attempted to fit the approach
of the expert's discipline within the legal matrix. This approach
leads to wonderfully intellectual excursions into abstract complexity.
There is a tendency, however, to lose sight of the purpose of the
legal inquiry, neglecting to ask the simple question: Does this ap-
proach help the jury answer the question?129
Is there a legally significant difference in the probative value of
testimony about the possibility of human error as opposed to delib-
erate falsehood? The answer is no. It makes no difference whether
the testimony will assist the jury in deciding if a witness has made a
mistake or is lying since both are problems juries must resolve. The
jury in Alexander was faced with both problems. The experts' testi-
mony might have helped the jury decide whether the eyewitnesses,
acquaintances, and friends were mistaken. Their testimony also
could have helped the jury decide if the defendant was telling the
truth when he denied robbing the bank. If the testimony can help
with either, it should be admitted.
Does it matter if the testimony relates to perception, as opposed
to memory? Once again, the answer is no. These distinctions only
only one wish and that was to tell the truth and not lose my temper. I think
I did both. [The prosecutor], on the other hand, was determined to try and
have me lose my temper and distort the truth.
Id. at 46 (quoting a letter from Dr. Binger to Dr. Slovenko). Experiences like that of
Dr. Binger have had their effect on psychiatrists and psychologists.
One might hope that psychiatrists would open up their reservoirs of knowl-
edge in the courtroom. Unfortunately, in my experience, they try to limit
their testimony to conclusory statements couched in psychiatric terminol-
ogy. Thereafter, they take shelter in a defensive resistance to questions
about the facts that are and ought to be in their possession. They thus
refuse to submit their opinions to the scrutiny that the adversary process
demands.
E. BENEDMc. CHILD PsYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, at 46 (1980). Given the long course of
aversion therapy administered by trial lawyers and the courts, such defensive behav-
ior is, perhaps, understandable.
129. Whatever its motivation, the Alexander court ultimately focused on this is-
sue. United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d at 168.
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help determine if the evidence is relevant to credibility. If the evi-
dence is relevant to any aspect of credibility, it is presumed admissi-
ble.130 It does not matter if the testimony relates to factors affecting
the abilities of all or most persons as opposed to those of a particu-
lar witness. Testimony relating only to a particular statement of a
single witness may still be of help to the jury.
Admissibility depends only upon a determination that the evi-
dence can assist the jury in deciding the case."3 1 As long as the evi-
dence relates to a legitimate issue for determination, admissibility is
not dependent upon which task it helps the jury accomplish. The
federal advisory committee envisioned a more direct approach.
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may
be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained lay-
man would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best
possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from
those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in
the dispute. 1"
This suggests only two criteria for admission: (1) whether the tes-
timony offers information beyond the common knowledge of the
jury, and (2) whether the expert brings the benefit of skills of obser-
vation or analysis beyond those of the lay juror. The distinction be-
tween these two criteria was addressed in State v. Kim." The trial
court in that case admitted testimony by a psychiatrist called by the
prosecution. The doctor testified about characteristics observed in
children who were victims of rape by family members. The doctor
also compared these characteristics to his personal observations of
the victim."" The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed, holding.
[A]lthough the comparisons performed and conclusions reached by
the witness could arguably have been done by the jury, the exper-
tise of the witness as a clinician and his ability to actually compare
the conduct and character of the complainant with that of other
victims suggests that his opinion regarding the concurrence of
these characteristics would be of some assistance to the jury in
making their own evaluations.135
130. FE. R Evm. 402.
131. At this point in the inquiry the court has already made two decisions. First,
the witness qualifies as an expert. Second, there is sufficient evidence of the validity
of the underlying science to warrant its submission to the jury.
132. FED. R. Evm. 702 advisory committee's note (quoting Ladd, Expert Testi-
mony, 5 VAND. L. Rxv. 414, 418 (1952)).
133. 645 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1982). The Hawaii Rules of Evidence became effective
shortly after the trial. The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, expressly based its anal-
ysis on the principles set forth in HAw. R. Evm. 102 and 702-705. Id. at 1335-36.
134. Id. at 1333-34.
135. Id. at 1338. Recently, the Hawaii Supreme Court again addressed this issue,
using this distinction to reach the opposite conclusion as to admissibility. In State v.
Batangan, 799 P.2d 48 (Haw. 1990), the court found the admission of expert testi-
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It is often difficult to determine when proffered expert testimony
will add necessary information or analysis to the jury's deliberation.
The proffered expert testimony, however, is not the problem. In de-
termining the preliminary questions of expertise and scientific valid-
ity, the court generally is made aware of what the expert has to of-
fer. The problem lies in determining what the jury knows. 180 The
proponent's obligation is to offer evidence satisfying the court that
the proffered testimony may help the jury. Conclusive proof that the
expert testimony is beyond or counter to common knowledge is not
required. The jury's task of determining credibility is inherently dif-
ficult. Courts should resolve doubts in favor of admission.
Yesterday's resolution of today's commonplace is helpful. Today,
the testimony of accident reconstructionists is routinely admitted.
This was not always the case. Twenty years before the adoption of
mony bolstering the credibility of the alleged victim in a child abuse case reversible
error. The court noted that the witness must first be found to be an expert, and the
proffered testimony must add something "not commonly known or understood." Id.
at 54. The court then found the expert's testimony was "minuscule," and noted that
the expert "several times asked the jury to recall their own childhood days and sug-
gested that Complainant's actions were actions of normal children under similar cir-
cumstances." Id. Such testimony failed to meet the requirements of Rule 702. See
also State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
136. The court must answer this question within the context of a particular trial.
Logically, the focus should be on what this particular jury is likely to know and un-
derstand. "Common knowledge," on the other hand, is an expression of a presumed
average. It may or may not accurately predict the actual knowledge of a specific
group of individuals. The inherent accuracy of such a predictor decreases as the num-
ber of individuals whose knowledge is being predicted decreases. Furthermore, the
decision implicitly rests upon the individual judge's preconception of what is and is
not a matter of "common knowledge" among the community. Trial judges rarely re-
late such decisions to what is known of the individuals actually sitting in the jury
box. The voir dire process and preemptive challenges effectively insure that individu-
als who have particularly relevant experience, knowledge, or skill will not be sworn as
jurors. It is hard to conceive of counsel for eithes side allowing a psychiatrist to re-
main on a jury in a case where either or both plan on calling a psychiatrist as an
expert.
Judicial inquiries into what is within the common knowledge are not confined to
this issue. "Common knowledge," for instance, is also a basis for judicial notice where
it refers to matters known "generally in the course of the ordinary experience of life"
or matters "accepted ... as true and ... capable of ready and unquestionable dem-
onstration." Roden v. Connecticut Co., 113 Conn. 408, 415, 155 A. 721, 723 (1931). In
English v. Miller, 43 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), the court suggested that
"common knowledge" as a basis for judicial notice should be limited to the operation
of natural forces and universally accepted principles of science and mechanics. For
instance, in professional malpractice cases the plaintiff must call an expert in the
defendant's profession who is willing to testify that the care or service fell below the
standard. There is a "common knowledge" exception to this rule, however. If the
alleged error is so plain that no special training or experience is necessary to recog-
nize it, the case may be submitted to the jury without the production of expert testi-
mony. See, e.g., Crowely v. O'Neil, 4 Kan. App. 2d 491, 494, 609 P.2d 198, 202 (1980);
Totten v. Adonga, 337 S.E.2d 2, 6 (W.Va. 1985).
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the Rules, federal district court Judge Vogel considered the propri-
ety of admitting a state trooper's opinion about which side of the
centerline the point of impact occurred.
[This is not [an issue] where the conclusion.., is so obvious that
any reasonable person, trained or not, could easily draw the infer-
ence..
Modem legal thinking indicates quite clearly that the rule ex-
cluding opinion evidence is to be applied sparingly, if at all, so that
the jury may have all evidence that may aid them in their determi-
nation of the facts. Thus, Wigmore states that, rightfully under-
stood, the true test of the rule is whether opinion testimony upon
this subject matter from this particular witness may appreciably
assist the jury.3'
Admitting the evidence of things the jury knows will cost some time.
Excluding information unknown to the jury may result in a verdict
based upon ignorance or mistaken assumptions. This approach is
consistent with the mandate of Rule 102.11"
One can almost hear the trial bench groaning under the weight of
yet another preliminary fact issue. While additional delay will occur,
it need not be prolonged. Nor should it occur in every case.sD Estab-
lishing the extent of common knowledge on the subject of the pro-
posed expert testimony is a preliminary matter, determined by the
court.1 40 The Rules of Evidence do not apply. 4 1 This will reduce the
time needed to lay the necessary foundation. Furthermore, the natu-
ral accretion of appellate decisions will result in a growing list of
subjects acknowledged as beyond the common wisdom.1'
137. Een v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 289, 293-94 (D.N.D.
1954) (citing 7 J. WIGMo EvmEN cE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1929 (3d ed.)
(emphasis added)). See also, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 639
(D.C. 1979); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
138. "These rules shall be construed to... the end that the truth may be ascer-
tained and proceedings justly determined." Fan. R. Evm. 102; M.R. Evid. 102.
139. As discussed later, not all evidence on credibility need be admitted, even if
contrary to common knowledge. See infra text accompanying notes 63-68. The credi-
bility of any witness is only as important as his testimony. The probative value of the
witness's testimony may be slight. In such cases Rule 403 may justify exclusion of the
proffered expert testimony as an unnecessary expenditure of time.
140. Fan. P. Evrn. 104(a).
141. FAD. R. EvID. 1101(b)(1).
142. The opinion in Kim is one example, as is State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660
P.2d 1208 (1983), discussed infra text accompanying notes 188-97.
Maine has developed an inventory of decisions on the subject. State v. Jacques, 558
A.2d 706 (Me. 1989) (admissibility of past sexual experiences of children to counter
jury's intuitive assumption that children would be unable to describe events charged
unless they had experienced them at the hands of the defendant); State v. Black, 537
A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988) (counterintuitive effects of abuse on children); State v. Wil-
loughby, 507 A.2d 1060 (Me. 1986) (puffing syndrome in prisoners); State v. Con-
logue, 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984) (enhanced probability of child abuse by adults who
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Judicial economy is a legitimate concern. Dockets are crowded.
Every additional hour of trial postpones the next trial. Considera-
tions of judicial economy, however, are a secondary priority.143 It is
justice that we are about. Justice is blindfolded to insure impartial-
ity. The blindfold also represents the singlemindedness of her pur-
suit. It would be sad to catch her peeking, even if only to cast an
impatient eye upon the courtroom clock.
There is a problem beyond the difficulty inherent in courts deter-
mining the extent of common knowledge. The common knowledge
may itself be wrong. This phenomenon is often referred to by the
rubric "counterintuitive. '' 144 Determining whether or not evidence is
counterintuitive is fairly simple-once the court has determined
what the common knowledge on the subject is. It merely requires
that the court compare the proffered testimony with the common
knowledge. Counterintuitive information is helpful per se. Failure to
admit such evidence is calculated to produce a verdict based upon a
false premise.145
a. Is the expert's assessment of credibility duplicative of the fact-
finder's efforts?
As previously discussed, credibility assessment is an essential as-
pect of the behavioral sciences. It is not confined to forensic applica-
tions. The behavioral scientists' reliance upon their ability to assess
credibility is sufficient to establish their legal competency to testify
on the issue. 4" The law also presumes the jury is competent. On
were abused as children); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981) (counterintuitive
effects of the battered spouse syndrome).
Appellate decisions holding that particular aspects of a subject are commonly
known will also occur. Caution is warranted, however, in applying such decisions to
subsequent cases. The ultimate basis of opinions reaching this result is a finding that
the proponent failed to carry her burden. This does not prevent another litigant from
doing a better job, or utilizing newly available studies.
143. Delay can itself cause injustice. Modem procedural rules, however, provide
mechanisms for effective legal triage. See, e.g., M.R. Evid. 102, 104; FED. R. EVID. 102,
104.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th
Cir. 1973); State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 273-74, 751 P.2d 1165, 1171 (1988).
145. See, e.g., State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984). In Conlogue, the de-
fendant father was accused of physically abusing his children. The children's mother
had initially confessed to the abuse. She retracted her confession when faced with
losing custody of her children. The trial court excluded evidence that the mother was
an abused child and expert testimony to the effect that parents who were abused as
children are more likely to abuse their own children. The Law Court held it was error
to exclude the evidence; such a phenomenon, being counterintuitive, tended to prove
the truthfulness of the mother's confession.
146. See the discussion, supra notes 94-145 and accompanying text ("Is the Wit-
ness an Expert?").
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first blush it appears the expert witness has nothing to offer. As
mentioned above, the behavioral sciences have yet to find a new
method of reliably detecting falsehood or error. Behavioral scientists
rely on the same methods as the law to detect specific instances of
falsehood and error. They can compare the patient's statement to
facts within their personal knowledge. They can compare it to other
sources of information and make a judgment on its relative credibil-
ity. They may also conclude the patient's statement is untrue based
upon internal inconsistencies. Finally, they may consider the impos-
sibility or improbability of the statement. These same methods are
available to the jury. Furthermore, the finder of fact has advantages
denied the behavioral scientists. The oath, the power of subpoena,
cross-examination by a skilled adversary, and all the other devices of
the trial are denied the doctor examining the patient.
It is equally true, however, that the behavioral scientists have ad-
vantages denied the finder of fact. Their primary advantage is the
ability to engender trust in the patient. The psychologist and psy-
chiatrist are in a much better position to encourage honesty and
frank self-examination. The sole purpose of treatment is to help the
individual.14 This is not true of the legal process. The client does
have an advocate committed to her best interest. The trial process,
however, presupposes that a party's interests are hostile to those of
another. Each party is subjected to the efforts of an adversary whose
goal is a result detrimental to him.
There are other factors enhancing the behavioral scientist's ability
to develop interpersonal trust. The relationship between the behav-
ioral scientist and the individual is inherently private. The impact of
privacy extends beyond the clinical setting. Individuals participating
in broad-based experiments are assured of anonymity. The behav-
ioral scientist is also generally afforded the time necessary to de-
velop a trusting and nonthreatening relationship. In contrast, the
courtroom is a public forum. The legal system forces a decision
within the relatively brief span of a trial. The fact-finder's exposure
to the witness is brief. Trial procedures are designed to preclude an
interpersonal relationship between the witness and finder of fact.
The clinical psychiatrist and psychologist are trained to be
nonjudgmental. The patient's frankness is unencumbered by fear of
condemnation. In contrast, the courtroom is a place of judgment.
Similarly, the experimental psychologists take care to minirie if
not eliminate their influence upon the participants and outcome.
Trial lawyers take care to achieve the opposite effect. The behav-
ioral scientists are also trained to be skilled listeners. Jurors have no
such training.
147. Forensic examinations are not conducted for the purpose of treatment.
Therefore, the doctor conducting a forensic examination is deprived of many of these
advantages.
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The assessment of credibility by behavioral scientists is based
upon knowledge and skills absent in jurors. Their testimony adds
otherwise missing dimensions to the information available to the
finder of fact. Their opinions are not duplicative of the jury's
deliberation.
b. The mentally ill, normative, and impaired witness
Expert testimony on credibility is helpful to the jury if it explains
factors affecting a witness's perception, memory, or ability to com-
municate. It is the effect of these factors which makes the evidence
helpful. It does not matter if the effect results from mental illness,
is inherent in all normative individuals, or results from an impair-
ment found in an otherwise normative individual.148
Nevertheless, these distinctions are helpful to our inquiry on two
grounds. First, they relate directly to the jury's understanding of
both the underlying phenomenon of mental illness, normativeness,
and impairment, and the sciences devoted to their study. There are
real differences between the extent and accuracy of common knowl-
edge about each of these three areas. Second, many courts have at
least implicitly recognized these distinctions when addressing the
helpfulness issue. Therefore, these distinctions are helpful in exam-
ining the validity of various criteria used by courts in considering
the usefulness of the expert testimony.
(i) The Mentally Ill Witness
The mentally ill witness has proven the easiest of the three cate-
gories for the courts. Courts and jurors are more conscious of their
own ignorance about mental illness, and tend to readily acknowledge
the need for expert help.
Recognition of severe mental illness by common law courts is an
ancient thing. Lord Coke commented upon the exclusion of wit-
nesses deemed non compos mentis. Coke distinguished between the
idiot (congenitally impaired), the lunatic (periodic fits of impair-
ment), those impaired by grief or other circumstance, and those who
temporarily impair themselves as through drunkenness. 14 9 Sanity
148. For the purposes of this discussion, "mental illness" is used to describe per-
sons diagnosed as suffering from a clinically recognized disorder. The author has
coined the term "normative individual" to describe persons not suffering from mental
illness and to distinguish such individuals from those who do. "Impairment" is used
to describe any experience or circumstance likely to affect the testimonial accuracy of
an otherwise normative individual.
The fields of psychiatry and psychology have a well founded aversion to the adjec-
tive "normal" as applied to individuals. The lay person and legal profession, however,
find the term sufficient for most purposes.
149. 2 J. WiGMOR, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 492 (rev. ed. 1979)
(quoting E. CoKE, NoTEs UPON LrrLETON, 246b (1628)).
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was always subject to proof or attack by lay opinion in English
courts.150 In the United States, however, development of the opinion
rule created a problem. The opinion rule was applied to exclude lay
opinions on the subject. At the time, however, there was no recog-
nized field of expertise on mental or emotional illness. By the mid-
nineteenth century the absurdity of the result was apparent. 1 ,
By excluding or limiting lay opinions, the opinion rule also fos-
tered early recognition of the admissibility of expert testimony on
the issue of impairment. The modern science of psychology was
founded by Wilhelm Wundt, who established the first experimental
psychology laboratory at the University of Leipzig in 1879.102 In the
1890's, Dr. Freud began his medical career. In the United States,
admission of expert testimony about mental illness as relevant to
credibility of a witness predates both Wundt and Freud.
Perhaps the earliest American example can be found in Lessees of
Armstrong v. Timmons,"53 decided in 1841. The defendant called a
justice of the peace as the sole surviving witness to the execution of
a deed. The plaintiff objected to the justice's competency. The
plaintiff called the witness's brother and nephew, both of whom
happened to be doctors. The trial court admitted the doctors' testi-
mony, but found the justice of the peace incompetent to testify. On
appeal, the defendant claimed the doctors should not have been per-
mitted to express their opinions. The court found that "[t]he opin-
ions of medical men are entitled to peculiar weight on this subject,
especially if they have had good means of observation as is the case
[here]." 1"
In 1854, the New York Court of Common Pleas specifically held
that opinion testimony on mental illness was admissible on the issue
of a witness's credibility, as opposed to competency. In Rivara u.
Ghio,15 the defendant called a witness to prove that the plaintiff's
witness, who testified without objection, "had been of imbecile mind
and memory." This offer was overruled on the ground that the ob-
150. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1933 (rev. ed. 1979).
151. The decision in Clary's Administrators v. Clary, 24 N.C. 62,2 Ired. 78 (1841),
and Justice Doe's dissent in Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.IL 120 (1866), led mo3t
courts back to acceptance of lay opinions on the existence and apparent effects of
mental illness. 7 J. WIGMORE. EvmENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 1933 (rev. ed.
1979).
152. T. LEAHEY, A Hisvony oF PSYCHOLOGY 181 (1987).
153. 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 342 (1841). This case did not involve expert te3timony on the
issue of witness credibility. The trial court heard testimony from the doctor first and
then ruled the witness incompetent.
154. Id. at 346.
155. 3 Smith 264 (N.Y. C.P. 1854). This is the earliest case on point found by the
author. The facts of this case have a curiously modem ring. Plaintiff left some lug-
gage with the defendant in New York. By some unexplained mechanism the luggage
ended up in Cleveland. When returned, it had been "rifled," and some of the contents
were missing.
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jection should have been taken earlier "upon the calling of [the] wit-
ness" herself. " The judgment was reversed: "Such evidence would
tend to prove that less reliance should be placed upon her state-
ments than those of a witness who was compos mentis."'' 7 The
plaintiff's argument that the defendant had waived any objection to
the witness's competency by not objecting when she was called to
the stand was rejected. "[Such testimony] may be given in evidence
as going to the degree of credit to which the testimony of the wit-
ness is entitled .... "12 As early as 1862, it was recognized that
some doctors had greater experience than others in dealing with pa-
tients "suffering from mental maladies."1 19
Throughout the balance of the nineteenth century, a growing
number of courts reached the same conclusion. One of the earliest
federal decisions implicitly approving admission of expert testimony
on credibility is District of Columbia v. Armes. 60 The plaintiff sued
for injuries sustained when he slipped off the edge of an elevated
sidewalk, falling two feet, and sustaining a "concussion which in-
jured his spine and produced partial paralysis, resulting in the im-
pairment of his mind and ultimately [after trial] in his death.10
The plaintiff testified at the trial. Although his testimony was
neither incoherent nor unintelligible, "it appeared from his testi-
mony that his mind was feeble ." 62 After the plaintiff testified, two
doctors were called. 63 One doctor had treated the plaintiff for his
injuries at a general hospital. While there, the plaintiff had at-
tempted suicide. The doctor testified that the plaintiff was, at that
time, "deranged and insane." The other doctor had treated the
plaintiff while he was a patient at the Government Hospital for the
Insane. He testified that the plaintiff suffered from "acute melan-
choly," that his "memory was impaired," and that there was some
"confusion of ideas in his mind." 6' After the doctors testified, the
defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's testimony on the ground
that he was incompetent. The trial court denied the motion. The
District of Columbia Supreme Court affirmed, holding the evidence
156. Id. at 268.
157. Id.
158. Id. The court cites no authority in support of either proposition.
159. Fairchild v. Basqomb, 35 Vt. 398, 409 (1862). This case discusses the expert
qualifications of a doctor associated with institutions devoted to the care of the in-
sane. It also contains an excellent survey of the early American cases discussing the
admission of expert testimony on the question of testamentary capacity based upon
facts provided by lay witnesses. Id. at 412-16.
160. 107 U.S. 519 (1882). The plaintiff was a doctor. At the time of the accident
he was a civilian working for the United States Army.
161. Id. at 520.
162. Id.
163. Id. It is not clear whether the doctors were initially called by the plaintiff on
damage issues, or by defendant solely to impeach plaintiff.
164. Id. at 520.
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was properly submitted to the jury on the issue of plaintiff's
credibility." 5
This century has seen a general trend away from judicial disquali-
fication of witnesses on the grounds of incompetency."co This trend
has created a concomitant growth in both the need and willingness
to admit evidence of mental illness on the issue of credibility of af-
flicted, but competent, witnesses. 67 During the same period, both
psychiatry and psychology achieved recognition as valid disciplines
within medicine. As a result, the necessity of relying upon lay opin-
ions to determine issues of mental illness declined. Today, it is gen-
erally accepted that the behavioral sciences have outstripped the lay
person's understanding of mental illness. It is also accepted that the
behavioral sciences have developed skills in diagnosis and evaluation
beyond that of judges and jurors. 6 " Expert testimony is helpful in
165. For other early cases accepting expert testimony on impairment to attack
credibility, see Alleman v. Stepp, 52 Iowa 626, 3 N.W. 636 (1879) (error to exclude
testimony of physician concerning impairment of plaintiff's memory after injury and
the subsequent amputation of leg); Derwin v. Parsons, 52 Mich. 425, 18 N.W. 200
(1884) (expert permitted to testify that plaintiff in an "indecent assault and battery"
case was diagnosed as suffering from a specified disease and that a substantial per-
centage of women having the disease tended to suffer hallucinations concerning the
conduct of men); Lord v. Beard, 79 N.C. 5 (1878) (physician permitted to give opinion
that paralysis tended to impair minds of the elderly); Anderson v. State, 65 Tex.
Crim. 365, 144 S.W. 281 (1912) (error to exclude expert testimony concerning effect of
government witness's use of cocaine upon her mental and moral sensibilities); State v.
Pryor, 74 Wash. 121, 132 P. 874 (1913) (reversing the trial court's refusal to admit
medical testimony that prosecutrix was suffering from hysteria (resulting in delusions
and hallucinations) in an abortion prosecution); State v. Robinson, 12 Wash. 491, 41
P. 884 (1895) (physician should be permitted to testify concerning the effects of mor-
phine generally but not as to effects on the witness); and State v. Perry, 41 W. Va.
641, 24 S.E. 634 (1896) (approving testimony by doctor as to hallucinations of plain-
tiff caused by treatment with chloroform and ether).
It is interesting to note that all of the above cases, save two, involved claims of
medical malpractice or testimony by women, usually as victims in sexual asaults.
Perry involved both. In People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 224 N.W. 387, 388 (1929),
two doctors were permitted to testify that the victim in a statutory rape case was "a
pathological falsifier, nymphomaniac, and sexual pervert." But see State v. Pelser,
182 Iowa 1, 163 N.W. 600 (1917) (affirming exclusion of medical testimony on the
effect of premature sexual development in a prosecution for incest on grounds that
the effects on women are disputed by experts in the field); and State v. Driver, 83 W.
Va. 479,107 S.E. 189, 15 A.L.R. 917 (1921) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony in
attempted rape case that victim was a "moron," and therefore prone to lie about
sexual matters).
166. 2 J. WIGMoP, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw §§ 501 (policy of abolish-
ing disqualification through mental derangement) & 509 (policy of abolishing disqual-
ification by infancy) (rev. ed. 1979).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559, 559-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951).
168. Recognition of the comparative inadequacy of the lay witness is reflected by
the typical statutory requirements mandating the testimony of a psychologist or psy-
chiatrist in commitment proceedings, or to determine sanity in criminal cases. Model
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both respects. It can help the jury detect the existence of mental
illness in a witness. It can also help in assessing the impact of the
condition upon the witness's testimony.
The sociopathic personality presents many special problems. One
symptom of this mental illness is the inability to recognize any obli-
gation to tell the truth.6 9 The shift from the effects of mental illness
on the risk of error to the effects on risk of falsehood has proven a
problem for some courts. 170 Such evidence should not be excluded
under Rule 702 on the basis that it is not helpful. There is no logical
distinction between expert testimony on mental illness as it affects
accuracy of perception, and as it affects truthfulness. Furthermore,
by dint of long and dedicated practice, many sociopaths have be-
come extremely accomplished liars. For all its strengths, the adver-
sary system is defenseless against the plausible lie told by the skill-
ful liar.
Lying is not confined to sociopaths. Certainly all of us are
Penal Code § 4.05 (1980). But see State v. Boone, 444 A.2d 438, 444 (Me. 1982). In
Boone, the Law Court held the trial justice, as finder of fact, competent to determine
sanity of a criminal defendant based on observations during the trial. The trial jus-
tice's determination was affirmed, notwithstanding uncontradicted expert testimony
to the contrary. The opinion notes the absence of any evidence of prior mental or
psychological problems. The Law Court also remarked on the absence of any "indica.
tion" of mental impairment in the defendant's conduct during trial.
169. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1987)
(DSM HI) has abandoned the term "Sociopathic Personality" in favor of "Antisocial
Personality Disorder." Common usage has not followed suit. The DSM III description
of the Antisocial Personality Disorder states in part:
The essential feature of this disorder is a pattern of irresponsible and
antisocial behavior beginning in childhood or early adolescence and contin-
uing into adulthood. For this diagnosis to be given, the person must be at
least 18 years of age and have a history of Conduct Disorder before the ago
of 15.
Lying, stealing,.. . [and etc.] are typical childhood signs. In adulthood
the antisocial pattern continues ....
Finally, [people with Antisocial Personality Disorder] generally have no
remorse about the effects of their behavior on others; they may even feel
justified in having hurt or mistreated others.
DSM I § 301.70.
Dr. Sobchuk's proffered testimony in State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343 (Me. 1989),
provides an example of all three. See Transcript, supra note 10, at 324-29 (basis of
diagnosis), 330 (impairment affecting ability to distinguish fantasy from reality), and
327 (pathological aspects of the boy's lying). The boy in Woodburn, however, did not
suffer from an Antisocial Personality Disorder (i.e., he was not a sociopath). By defi-
nition, the diagnosis of this mental illness is restricted to adults. DSM III § 301.70
(1987).
170. Commonwealth v. Repyneck, 181 Pa. Super. 630, 124 A.2d 693 (1956) (The
trial court permitted psychiatric testimony about the impact of this disorder on the
ability to perceive, recall, or communicate. The trial judge excluded all testimony
about the effect of a sociopathic personality disorder on the ability to understand and
comply with the obligation to tell the truth. The exclusion was affirmed.).
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tempted to lie. Most of us cannot avoid the subtle indications of
discomfort in voice and body language when lying. It is hoped that
the jury will detect and recognize these subtle clues as signals of
falsehood. The premise does not apply to sociopaths. Lacking con-
science, sociopaths have no guilt and, therefore, no discomfort when
lying. Unless the jurors are aware of these attributes of the soci-
opathic personality, they will have no reason not to rely on such
clues, and, finding none, conclude the witness is telling the truth.
This is not a revolutionary concept. The justification for permitting
reputation evidence of the witness's character for truthfulness rests
in large part on this truth. In the artificial and relatively brief expo-
sure to any witness, there is always the risk that the jury will be
unable to detect falsehood.
Mental illness has a more compelling effect upon behavior than
does a person's character.' 7 ' It would be passingly strange to admit
reputation evidence, based on who knows what, of a witness's char-
acter, but exclude the diagnosis and expert knowledge of a licensed
doctor as to the existence and known effects of a mental illness. The
Federal Rules of Evidence also permit lay opinions on a witness's
character for truthfulness. 17 2 It would be even stranger to admit lay
opinions on truthfulness while excluding those of the expert. 731
Testimony about the effect of mental illness upon truthfulness is
no less helpful than that about effects upon the accuracy of percep-
tion, recall, or communication. The only foundational requirement
to establish the relevancy of expert testimony on the subject is evi-
dence upon which the jury might find: (1) the witness suffered from
a mental illness; and, (2) that the mental illness might affect the
witness's abilities to perceive, recall, or communicate accurately or
honestly.
Certainly, there is a risk that jurors may choose to believe or dis-
believe the subject witness based only upon the diagnosis and expla-
nation. That risk can be minimized by proper instruction of the
jury. The risk that the jury will believe a plausibly spun falsehood is
inherently greater. The jurors are told that they should not abdicate
all responsibility for the judgment of credibility. As a group, they
can be relied upon to at least try to do what is right. This is simply
171. Cross-examination is also likely to be a more effective tool in di&overing
truth when applied to the opinion of an expert. An individual's reputation is pre-
sumed to be the result of multiple individual opinions which are bandied about the
community. Each source is presumed to have some basis for judging the subject wit-
ness. Each source must also have some motive to tell others of this opinion. The
sources of reputation are not available for cross-examination. The expert witness is.
172. FED. 1. Evm. 405, 608. A number of states, including Maine, do not permit
opinion evidence of character.
173. See United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1110 (1990) (exclusion of expert analysis of surveillance photographs while
admitting lay opinions about the identity of the person depicted).
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not true in the case of the sociopathic witness.
(ii) The Normative Witness'7 4
Alexander Pope reminded us that error is an inherent accident of
the human condition.275 All humans understand that others may lie.
Both facts are within the common knowledge. Equally important for
our inquiry, all adults have practical experience in evaluating
credibility.
Most individuals understand that the probability of error differs
from one human activity to another. Jurors can also be relied upon
to understand that many circumstances can increase or decrease the
chance for error in any given activity. Almost by definition, norma-
tive individuals recounting their memory of something within the
broad range of commonplace experience do not present a problem.
Scientific evidence concerning perception, memory, and communica-
tion of a normative individual which corresponds to the folk wisdom
of common knowledge adds nothing. The evidence should be "ex-
cluded... because [it is] unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a
waste of time.' 7
6
As previously discussed, however, common knowledge is occasion-
ally wrong. 77 The disparity between the assumptions of common
knowledge and the findings of behavioral research into eyewitness
identification has grown enormously in recent years. The issue has
become one of the most litigated subjects involving the credibility of
normative witnesses, and is a good vehicle for exploring problems in
this area.
United States v. Amara' 7 8 has stood as the leading case for the
exclusion of such evidence for over fifteen years. The jury convicted
Manuel Amaral of bank robbery. At trial the defense called a psy-
chologist who would testify about the effects of stress upon the abil-
ity of eyewitnesses to identify persons seen during a stressful event.
The trial judge ruled the psychologist's testimony inadmissible, stat-
174. "Normative" is used to designate an individual who is not mentally ill or
impaired. See supra note 148.
175. A- POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRTCISM ("To err is human..
176. FED. R. Evm. 702 advisory committee's note (citing 7 J. WIGMoRs, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1918 (rev. ed. 1979)).
177. Compare Cutler & Penrod, Forensically Relevant Moderators of the Rela-
tion Between Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and Confidence, 74 J. APPLIED Psy-
CHOLOGY 650 (1989) (suggesting there is no correlation between the confidence with
which the witness makes the identification and the accuracy of the identification)
with Whitlay & Greenberg, The Role of Eyewitness Confidence in Juror Perception,
16 J. APPLED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 387 (1986) (witness confidence is a prime factor in
juror evaluation of credibility, except where expertise is considered a relevant factor).
For research suggesting that jurors hold certain negative and unjustified stereotypes
of children as witnesses, see Ross, Dunning, Toglia, & Ceci, The Child in the Eyes of
the Jury, 14 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 5 (1990).
178. 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
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ing "it would not be appropriate to take from the jury their own
determination as to what weight or effect to give to the evidence of
the eye-witness and identifying witnesses and to have that determi-
nation put before them on the basis of the expert witness testimony
as proffered."1"'
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Speaking for the court, Judge Turren-
tine established four criteria for the admission of expert opinion tes-
timony. "1. qualified expert; 2. proper subject;180 3. conformity to a
generally accepted explanatory theory; and 4. probative value com-
pared to prejudicial effect."""' The decision in Amaral predates en-
actment of the Federal Rules of Evidence by some two years, a fact
infrequently noted by courts citing Amaral. Judge Turrentine ap-
parently concluded that exclusion of the expert testimony resulted
in no impediment to the pursuit of truth. Counsel could effectively
raise the same issues through cross-examination.
"Our legal system places primary reliance for the ascertainment of
truth on the 'test of cross-examination.'" In [United States v.] De
Sisto,82 a truck driver ... testified as to the identity of the hi-
jacker and gave conflicting testimony regarding... tattoo marks
on the accused's arms. Judge Friendly wrote that the jury was "su-
perbly equipped" to evaluate the impact of the stress during the
hijacking on the perception of the identification witness. It is the
responsibility of counsel during cross-examination to inquire into
the witness' opportunity for observation, his capacity for observa-
tion, his attention and interest and his distraction or division of
attention.1183
Judge Turrentine's reliance on cross-examination and argument of
counsel was misplaced. These devices are ineffective when applied to
counterintuitive matters. Convincing jurors that their common sense
is wrong is a daunting task. Even the most skillful of trial lawyers
are likely to fail. Such arguments are especially likely to prove futile
when fabricated from whole cloth with no support in the evidence.,"
Judge Turrentine also engaged in an analysis of the underlying
science. He referred to Dr. Buckout, "whose expertise in the area of
perception was acknowledged by the Government (although he was
179. Id. at 1153 (quoting the trial transcript).
180. "Proper subject" refers to expert testimony which "serves to inform the
court (and jury) about affairs not within the full understanding of the average man."
Id. at 1152-53 (quoting Farris v. Interstate Circuit, 116 F.2d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1941)).
181. Id. at 1153.
182. 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964).
183. Id. (citations omitted).
184. There is evidence that reliance on these "engines of the truth" is misplaced
even in cases involving factors traditionally considered effective attacm upon credi-
bility. Lindsay, Lim, Marando & Cully, Mock-Juror Evaluation of Eyewitness Testi-
mony: A Test of Metamemory Hypothesis, 16 J. APLmD Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 447
(1986).
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not to testify at the trial)."185 Dr. Buckout's research revealed "eye-
witnesses do reply 'I can't recall, it happened so fast.'" The court
thought this significant. The court also noted that defense counsel
had failed to bring out any inconsistencies in the eyewitnesses' testi-
mony on cross-examination. Based on Dr. Buckout's revelations and
the cross-examination, the court concluded that the witnesses' abil-
ity to perceive and remember was unaffected. Finally, Judge Turren-
tine noted that the eyewitnesses were subjected to different levels of
stress.
Considered in detail, Judge Turrentine's reasoning is less than
persuasive. The court's finding that the witnesses' perceptions were
not affected is irrelevant. This is a question for the jury to decide,
not the court. Under the Rules of Evidence the issue is whether or
not the jury might have found the testimony helpful. Moreover,
some witnesses may indeed say they cannot recall because "it hap-
pened too fast." Such a fact does not support a conclusion that a
witness will never positively identify the wrong person in complete
good faith. Nor does distortion of perception or memory necessarily
result in inconsistencies demonstrable during cross-examination.
Neither premise compels the court's conclusion.
Stress can have a dramatic effect on the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications. That effect can be counterintuitive. There is strong
evidence to suggest that the intuitive criteria used by jurors to as-
sess accuracy of the identification is wrong.180 This leads to an un-
comfortable conclusion. Common knowledge of factors affecting the
accuracy of an eyewitness identification is often incomplete or
wrong. Absent appropriate expert testimony, the possibility that
eyewitnesses may be mistaken cannot be effectively demonstrated
by the tools of cross-examination and argument. Left to their own
devices, the jury's verdict must be based upon speculation, igno-
rance, or assumptions which are demonstrably false.1 8 7
185. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1153.
186. See the discussion of State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 293-94, 660 P.2d 1208,
1220-21 (1983), infra at text accompanying note 188. Judge Turrentine's observation
that the witnesses experienced different levels of stress is also a non sequitur. The
only issue is whether or not information might have helped the jury assess the credi-
bility of at least one witness.
187. Hoffheimer, Requiring Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evi-
dence at Federal Criminal Trials, 80 J. CmaM. L. & CMMINOLOGY 585, 593 (1989).
Professor Michael Hoffheimer is among those concerned about the growing gulf be-
tween common knowledge and the behavioral scientists' understanding of eyewitness
identification. He proposes use of jury instructions to advise the jurors of factors
known to affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification. Professor Hoffheimer ar-
gues that instructions are a more cost-effective solution than expert testimony. His
article also surveys the history, use, and treatment on appeal of generic eyewitness
instructions by the various circuits. His approach is reminiscent of the original prac-
tice of direct consultation of experts by the court. Professor Hoffheimer's suggestion
is worthy of exploration, but there are problems with this approach. Generalized pat-
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In 1984, in State v. Chapple,8 8 the Arizona Supreme Court broke
with the line of authority based upon Amaral. The defendant was
charged with two drug offenses and three counts of first degree mur-
der. The killings occurred in Arizona during a purchase of marijuana
by two buyers from Kansas City. The buyers had more in mind than
purchasing a large quantity of marijuana. They also wished to pun-
ish the sellers for financial misdeeds during an earlier transaction.
Two Arizonans helped the out-of-town buyers arrange for the
purchase and were present at the sale. Both helped the buyers de-
stroy evidence of the killings. One of the surviving Arizonans, Mr.
Scott, wished to discuss the matter with the authorities. Predictably,
two things happened: Mr. Scott obtained a grant of immunity and
identified, from photographs, Mr. Chapple as one of the two buyers.
The prosecution was eventually able to induce Mr. Scott's co-broker
to also become a witness for the state.
The defendant, Mr. Chapple, claimed he had been wrongfully
identified. At his extradition hearing seven witnesses testified he was
in Illinois on the day of the killings. At trial, the defendant called a
clinical psychologist specializing in perception and memory as a wit-
ness. The psychologist's testimony was offered to rebut the eyewit-
ness identifications by Mr. Scott and his partner. The trial judge
excluded the testimony. The trial court shared Judge Turrentine's
faith in the art of cross-examination, if not argument: "I don't find
anything... that this expert is going to testify to... that couldn't
really be covered in cross-examination of the witnesses who made
the identification, and probably will be excessively argued in closing
arguments to the jury."'8 9
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority,
Justice Feldman acknowledged that most jurisdictions that had con-
sidered the question held similar testimony inadmissible.50 The
court then considered the four criteria propounded by Judge Tur-
rentine in United States v. Amaral as determinative of admissibil-
ity.'9' The psychologist's qualifications were more than adequate. 0 2
tern instructions risk omission or over-inclusion in many cases. The approach also
does not address the myriad other types of expertise available on credibility issues
not involving eyewitness identification. Finally, this approach would require a mecha-
nism for effectively updating the instructions.
188. 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
189. Id. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1220.
190. Justice Feldman also distinguished those cases decided on grounds inapplica-
ble under the facts of this case. Id. at 292, 660 P.2d at 1219.
191. 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973). I.e., (1) the witness is an expert; (2) the te3ti-
mony is a proper subject for expert testimony;, (3) the underlying theory is valid; and,
(4) the probative value of the testimony is not substantially outweighed by an un-
fairly prejudicial effect. The Arizona Supreme Court applied the test propounded in
Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923), requiring that the validity
of the underlying theory be "generally accepted" by experts in the field. The Frye
test was also used in Amaral. See discussion of the Frye test, supra text accompany-
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The scientific validity of her work was also unquestioned. The court
rejected the state's argument that the probative value of her testi-
mony was substantially outweighed by any unfairly prejudicial ef-
fect. The Arizona Supreme Court also found the proffered testimony
to be a "proper subject" of expert testimony under Rule 702.193
[Rule] 702 allows expert testimony if it "will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
Put conversely, the test "is whether the subject of inquiry is one of
such common knowledge that people of ordinary education could
reach a conclusion as intelligently as the [expert] witness . ... "
Furthermore, the test is not whether the jury could reach some
conclusion in the absence of the expert evidence, but whether the
jury is qualified without such testimony "to determine intelligently
and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlight-
enment from those having a specialized understanding of the sub-
ject. .. .
The trial judge had determined Dr. Loftus' testimony was not be-
yond common knowledge. The Arizona Supreme Court acknowl-
edged this was a proper grounds for excluding her testimony but
reached a different conclusion. "We note at the outset that the law
has long recognized the inherent danger in eyewitness testimony. Of
course, it is difficult to tell whether the ordinary juror shares the
law's inherent caution of eyewitness identification."1 5 The court
reviewed the proffered testimony in detail, 196 and concluded:
ing notes 69-75.
192. "Dr. Loftus specializes in an area of experimental and clinical psychology
dealing with perception, memory retention and recall. Her qualifications are unques-
tioned, and it may fairly be said that she 'wrote the book' on the subject." State v.
Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 291, 660 P.2d at 1218.
193. ARz R. Evm. 702 is identical to its federal counterpart, as is M.R. Evid. 702.
194. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 292-93, 660 P.2d at 1219-20 (1983) (citing FED.
R. Evm. 702 advisory committee's note quoting Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L.
REv. 414, 418 (1952)) (other citations omitted).
The Tennessee Rules of Evidence became effective on January 1, 1990. They pro-
vide an interesting counterpoint. Prior Tennessee case law held that only expert testi-
mony "necessary" to the trier of fact was admissible. As a result, Tennessee's version
of Rule 702 varied from the federal pattern. TENN. R. Evm. 702 provides expert testi-
mony is admissible when it will "substantially assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . " (emphasis added). One need not
be familiar with the Tennessee courts and bar to predict the imminent birth and
vigorous growth of a new line of appellate decisions dedicated to finding a working
definition of "substantial."
195. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1220 (emphasis added) (foot-
note in original: "The [varieties] of eyewitness identification are well known: the an-
nals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification .... 'What is
the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The identification
of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are estab-
lished by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American
trials.' ") (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967)).
196. Le., the "forgetting curve," which describes a rapid initial deterioration in
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We cannot assume that the average juror would be aware of the
variables concerning identification and memory about which Dr.
Loftus was qualified to testify.
Depriving [the] jurors of the benefit of scientific research on eye-
witness testimony force[d] them to search for the truth without full
knowledge and opportunity to evaluate the strength of the evi-
dence. In short, this deprivation prevent[ed] [the] jurors from hav-
ing "the best possible degree" of "understanding the subject" to-
ward which the law of evidence strives.'"
The decision in Chapple led to a broader recognition of the need
to admit evidence of the counterintuitive factors at play in eyewit-
ness 'identifications. In the following year, California followed the
lead of the Arizona courts;9 8 and one year later, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in its landmark opinion United States v. Down-
ing19 became the first federal court to acknowledge the admissibil-
ity of such expert testimony. In the six years since Downing, several
jurisdictions have either held that such testimony is admissible
based on the showing made in the trial court, or that the proponent
was entitled to the opportunity to make such a showing.20
The reasoning and analysis in Chapple is equally applicable to
any expert testimony on credibility. The key element is not the sub-
ject of eyewitness identification. The testimony is helpful, and
therefore admissible, because it provides the jury with information
which may be counterintuitive.
The foundation required for testimony about credibility of a nor-
memory, followed by a more gradual long term erosion (implying that early identifica-
tions are significantly more accurate than those occurring even a relatively short time
later); research shows most lay persons assume stress enhances memory, when in fact
it causes inaccurate perception and a concomitant distortion of memory;, the phenom-
enon of unconscious transfer resulting in confusion with persons seen in similar or
associated contexts (especially as prompted by photo lineups which include individu-
als the witness had seen at a time other than the crime); the unconscious effects of
post-event information and feedback upon the reconstructive proce~se3 of memory
and upon the witnesses' confidence in the identification (two of the witnez-es were
related and had discussed their identification of a defendant); the lack of correlation
between witness confidence and accuracy of the identification. Id. at 293-94, 660 P.2d
at 1220-21.
197. Id. at 294, 660 P.2d at 1221 (quoting Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?
Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification,
29 ST. L Rav. 969, 1017-18 (1977)) (emphasis added). The court found the defenza
had offered evidence that at least two aspects of Dr. Loftus' testimony were counter-
intuitive. I.e., the effect of stress on perception, and the lack of correlation between
witness confidence and accuracy. Consideration was also given to the other aspects of
her testimony. The court concluded it could not assume the testimony was within the
jury's common knowledge. This is the correct approach.
198. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709 (1984).
199. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
200. For a list of cases following Downing, see State v. Gunter, 554 A.2d 1356,
1362-63 (N.J. Super. 1989).
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mative witness differs significantly from that required in the case of
the mentally ill individual. It is not necessary to establish a diagno-
sis of a recognized mental illness. It is only necessary to offer evi-
dence that normative individuals are subject to some effect on their
ability to perceive, recall, or communicate, and that the effect is
counterintuitive. Evidence that the subject witness actually demon-
strated such an effect may enhance the probative value of the ex-
pert's testimony, but is not necessary as a foundational matter.
(iii) The Impaired Witness201
Impaired witnesses seem to fit into neither of the preceding cate-
gories. They are not mentally ill, but the effects of the impairment
distinguish them from other normative witnesses. Furthermore,
those effects are often limited to specific subjects or activities.202
The analysis under the Rules of Evidence parallels that used to de-
termine the admissibility of testimony about effects on all normative
individuals. Testimony about the effects of impairment will be help-
ful if: (1) there is a known impact upon the witness's ability to per-
ceive, recall, or communicate about some matter; and (2) the effect
is beyond the range of common knowledge or is counterintuitive.
It may occasionally be difficult to distinguish between impairment
and mental illness. The distinction is without significance for the
courts' purposes, however. As previously discussed, it is the effect of
these conditions, not the label, that determines if the testimony is
helpful. This proposition is often given only grudging acceptance by
the courts.20 3 Maine's experience is typical.
201. "Impairment" is used to describe an otherwise normative witness whose tes-
timonial accuracy is likely to be affected by an extraordinary experience or
circumstance.
202. Common phobias are perhaps the most commonly experienced extraordinary
influences. For example, the author's ability to accurately judge the size and aggres-
sive intent of any spider is highly suspect.
The psychologist's proposed testimony in State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d
1208, contains examples of counterintuitive effects of extraordinary circumstance on a
normative observer. See supra note 197. See also State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167
(Me. 1984); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); Convis, Testifying About Testi-
mony: Psychological Evidence on Perceptual and Memory Factors Affecting the
Credibility of Testimony, 21 DuQ. L. Rav. 579, 593-95 (1983-84).
203. See, e.g., State v. Castro, 756 P.2d 1033 (Haw. 1988). The trial court admit-
ted psychiatric testimony supporting the credibility of the complaining witness in an
attempted murder and aggravated assault case. The trial court relied on the earlier
decision in State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1982). The Hawaii Supreme Court
vacated and remanded, suggesting its earlier decision should be confined primarily to
child abuse cases. State v. Castro, 756 P.2d at 1044. In Kim the Hawaii Supreme
Court noted that some courts had limited expert testimony to cases involving "the
allegedly mentally ill witness and the mentally retarded witness ..... State v. Kim,
645 P.2d at 1337. The court also found admission justified when it related to "child
complainants whose claims are substantially uncorroborated." Id. at 1337-38.
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In 1977, the Law Court decided State v. Lewisohn.2 4 The jury
found the defendant guilty of murdering his wife. The defendant
claimed he accidentally shot his wife while he was cleaning a gun at
the kitchen table. The state called the two minor daughters of the
defendant and decedent as witnesses. The daughters were asleep in
their rooms when they were awakened by the sounds of their par-
ents arguing and a loud "bang." Mrs. Lewisohn had been shot in the
shoulder and was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospitalo 5 The
court summarized the younger daughter's trial testimony:
'[She] reached the kitchen first and observed her father kneeling
beside her wounded mother on the floor. She heard her mother cry.
"Jimmy, call the hospital, I'm bleeding." She stated that her father
then got up and said: "If it will make you happy, I'll shoot myself;
at least we will die together." She added that her father then shot
himself.
The other daughter, aged 14, then appeared... and, observing
her mother and father lying on the kitchen floor, telephoned for
medical assistance.2 0 °
The defendant called a psychologist who had watched the girls
testify.
The proffered opinion of this expert witness would have been to
the effect that children of that age will screen out facts in conflict
with their wishful thinking with resulting adjustment of their ini-
tial perception as well as their later remembrance of the events.
The presiding Justice excluded such evidence on the ground it
would be a very serious invasion of the province of the jury. We
agree.
The question at issue is, whether the credibility of a witness
whose competency.., is not disputed may be impeached by ex-
pert evidence that persons subjected to occurrences of a frightening
nature, and especially children... are incapable of accurately per-
ceiving, recalling and relating the events as they happened ....
Absent a "medical" condition affecting the ability of the witness
to tell the truth, evidence may not be received to discredit the
testimony of a witness in the nature of an expert's opinion that
the events were such as to have so affected the mental capacity of
such witness that his ability to make an accurate observation of
the facts and to retain a true recollection thereof has been im-
paired and that his assertions respecting the details of the occur-
rence will necessarily or most probably be a distortion. Any other
rule might lead to as many collateral issues as there are witnesses,
and would only serve to divert the minds of the jurors from the
204. 379 A.2d 1192 (Me. 1977). The Maine Rules of Evidence became effective in
February 1976. KR. Evid. 702-705 are substantially similar to the Federal Rules as
originally adopted.
205. Id. at 1196.
206. Id.
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true issues in the case. Such testimony would in effect take over
the jury's task of determining the weight and credibility of the wit-
ness' testimony.
We agree that a witness' capacity to perceive, recollect and
communicate may be impeached in certain circumstances, as
where the witness is afflicted with a disability affecting the
mental or physical processes, such as mental disease, blindness,
deafness, or the like.20 7
The decision in Lewisohn was announced in November of 1977.
Four months earlier two Brink's guards were picking up cash re-
ceipts from a department store when a man attempted to rob them.
An exchange of gun fire ensued. The would-be robber was wounded
and fled the scene. Later the same day, a Mr. Fernald appeared at a
local hospital, suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. The next
morning one of the Brink's guards was brought to the hospital where
he identified Mr. Fernald as the would-be robber. At trial the de-
fense attempted to call a psychologist to testify about the effects of
severe stress upon perception. The trial court sustained the state's
objection. The Law Court affirmed.20 8
We need not now consider, or intimate opinion on, whether
Lewisohn extends so far as to bar in all circumstances expert testi-
mony as to the effects of stress, or other factors, on the accuracy of
human perceptional processes to assist a fact-finder in determining
the reliability of eyewitness testimony .... It is sufficient for pre-
sent purposes that we decide that there was no error ... [in ex-
cluding] the proffered testimony .... The eyewitness identifica-
tions resulted from a direct and close, face-to-face confrontation of
the two eyewitnesses and the gunman. The light was good, and the
gunman's entire face was not obscured in any respect. The making
of direct face-to-face judgments of identification, and an awareness
of the factors bearing on the reliability of such judgments, are so
much a part of the day-to-day experiences of ordinary lay people
that we must conclude ... the jury was capable of making an in-
telligent assessment of the reliability of the identification ...
without need of the benefit of expert testimony as to how stress
may affect human perceptional processes.20 0
In Fernald the court suggested such evidence might be admissible,
even absent diagnosis of a "medical condition." The opinion in
Fernald also did not depend on a perceived need to defend the
"province of the jury." At most Fernald displayed hairline cracks in
reflexive exclusion of such evidence.
The court did not have long to walt for a third opportunity to
consider the problem. In State v. Anaya,2 10 the defendant stabbed
207. Id. at 1203-1204 (emphasis added).
208. State v. Fernald, 397 A.2d 194 (Me. 1979).
209. Id. at 197.
210. 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981).
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her lover in the back. He bled to death in her arms. She did not
contest these facts. Ms. Anaya claimed her lover had abused her and
that she acted in self-defense, or under extreme provocation. Al-
though Ms. Anaya did not testify, both trial counsel recognized the
believability of her defense as the central issue in the case." 1
The defense called a psychologist as an expert witness at trial to
testify that abused women often do not leave their abuser. He would
have explained that a "certain substrata of abused women perceive
suicide and/or homicide to be the only solutions to their
problems. '212 The trial justice stated that "although [the psycholo-
gist] was qualified to testify about the 'battered wife syndrome', the
evidence would be excluded as irrelevant, prejudicial, and confusing
to the jury. '213 The defendant also called a specialist in internal
medicine who had treated Ms. Anaya on several occasions for inju-
ries inflicted by the deceased. The doctor would have testified that
the defendant suffered from the battered spouse syndrome. The
trial justice also excluded this testimony."' The jury found Ms.
Anaya guilty of manslaughter. On appeal, the Law Court held the
evidence that had been admitted and offered was adequate founda-
tion to admit evidence that the defendant suffered from the "bat-
tered wife syndrome." There was no question as to the psycholo-
gist's competency to testify on the existence and effects of that
condition. The court held that the testimony "must be admitted
since it 'may have. . . a substantial bearing on her perceptions and
behavior at the time of the killing,... [and is] central to her...
defense.' "216
The Law Court focused on the correct issue. The helpfulness of
the testimony hinges upon the effect of the prior experience. The
label attached to those effects is irrelevant. How the behavioral sci-
ences choose to classify the effect of an abusive relationship upon
the victim is not the issue. Anaya stands for the proposition that
expert testimony about the fact and effect of experiences known to
affect perception is admissible. Admission does not depend upon
classification as a mental illness.2
1 6
211. "The State's closing argument focused on the 'bizarre' behavior of the victim
and the defendant, implying that defendant could not have been fearful of Williams
since she never attempted to leave him ..... Id. at 894.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 893.
214. Id. at 894.
215. Id. (quoting Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 639 (D.C. 1979) (em-
phasis added)).
216. It is not clear whether the court consciously thought of the problem as in-
volving expert testimony on credibility. The opinion is, however, framed around this
unarticulated assumption. The court recognized the proffered evidence as relevant to
the believability of Ms. Anaya's defense. The court understood that the proffered
testimony went directly to the issue of the truth and reasonableness of her percep-
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Recognizing the distinction between medical classification of the
cause and legal relevance of the effect avoids several problems.
These range from unresolved debates about classification within the
scientific community, to ensuring that the court and jury focus on
the relevant issue.
2 117
Finally, in State v. Black218 the Law Court seemed to resolve any
doubt about the effect of Anaya. In Black the trial court permitted
testimony by a psychiatric nurse called by the prosecution. The
nurse explained the "reason for timing and sequencing inconsisten-
cies in [the child victim's] testimony. 2 1 9 The nurse also described
certain indicators of abuse in a child which had been observed in the
victim. The Law Court affirmed. "Such testimony may be helpful to
the jury because it is not within a lay person's common knowledge
that a person who suffers some type of traumatic experience may
have difficulty relating that experience in a chronological, coherent
and organized manner." 20
In Black, however, the court apparently experienced some linger-
ing discomfort, finding it necessary to limit the admissibility of such
testimony to rebuttal evidence.
We recognize, however, that expert testimony offered to explain in-
consistent testimony or conduct of the victim can have the effect of
bolstering that person's credibility. Such evidence can have a
profound impact on the outcome of the trial, particularly, as in the
present case, when the prosecution offers the evidence to establish
its case in chief. Consequently, the prosecution may introduce ex-
pert testimony to assist the trier of fact in understanding an incon-
sistency in the victim's conduct or testimony only to rebut an ex-
tions at the critical moment.
Whatever the court's initial thoughts, in State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 173 (Me.
1984), it expressly recognized Anaya as requiring the admission of expert psychologi.
cal testimony on the credibility of a witness.
217. For a more detailed discussion of cases considering the admission of evidence
of the Battered Spouse Syndrome, see Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testi-
mony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Support of a Claim of Self-Defense, 15
CONN. L. Rxv. 121 (1982-83). Battered Spouse Syndrome is not the only condition
raising the question of admissibility of expert testimony. The recognition of Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD] also raises the issue. PTSD is in some respects
the parent of the Battered Spouse Syndrome. An even more recent offspring of
PTSD, the Battered Child Syndrome, is finding its way into the courts with growing
frequency. See, e.g., State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1989). Prose-
cutors are also offering expert testimony on the Rape Trauma Syndrome as corrobo-
ration of the victim's allegation. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291 (1984) (inadmissible); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d
1292 (1982) (admissible); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982) (inadmissi-
ble); State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918 (Mont. 1984) (admissible).
218. 537 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988).
219. Id. at 1156.
220. Id. at 1156-57. The trial court held other portions of the nurse's testimony
inadmissible on the ground there was no showing of the requisite scientific validity.
[Vol. 43:53
EXPERT TESTIMONY
press or implied defense assertion that such inconsistency makes it
improbable that either a crime was committed or that this defend-
ant committed the crime.2 2
This passage suggests a law of evidence as Alice might have found
it through the looking glass. It implies there is a danger in admitting
the proffered expert testimony because it is highly probative. Evi-
dence which is relevant is admitted precisely because, if believed, it
will have an impact upon the outcome of the trial. The adversary
system and the law of evidence are both intended to insure presen-
tation of all highly probative information. The only apparent dis-
tinction drawn by the court between the relevancy of this evidence
and that of evidence generally is the curious statement that such
evidence "can have the effect of bolstering. . . credibility." The evi-
dence is relevant only to credibility. It may help the jury assess the
credibility of the key witness. This is its sole contribution to the
pursuit of truth. Yet it seems the court wishes it could be assured
the evidence would not accomplish the only purpose for which it was
admitted. Curiouser and curiouser.
Why impose a special limitation on this type of evidence? Why
make admissibility of such evidence dependent on the conduct of
trial counsel?2 2 Why not determine admissibility by looking to the
issues presented by the evidence? If the child's testimony is argua-
bly confused or inconsistent, the expert testimony is likely to help
the jury. If it is not, the expert's testimony is superfluous. Who
raised the issue is not important. The only questions of concern are
whether the proffered testimony conveys information beyond what
the jurors can be reasonably expected to know, and whether the tes-
timony gives the jury the benefits of judgments by those having
skills beyond those of the average citizen. Therefore, the only foun-
dation necessary to establish the admissibility for such testimony is:
(1) evidence that the subject witness had an experience;22 3 (2) expert
testimony that such an experience might affect the witness's ability
to perceive, recall, or communicate matters within the scope of the
witness's testimony; and, (3) a determination that the jurors may
221. Id. at 1156.
222. Such a rule invites tactical game playing by both counsel The type of evi-
dence at issue presumes that a witness is incapable of giving internally consistent
testimony as to timing and sequence. Thus, the inconsistencies are likely to appear
during direct examination. Certainly the prosecution should be able to induce incon-
sistencies. The rule imposed in Black, however, prevents the state from presenting
expert testimony explaining the inconsistencies until and unless the defense suggests
the state's evidence is incredible.
223. The extraordinary circumstance need not have occurred during the testimo-
nial event. An experience which pre-dates the subject of the testimony may affect any
or all of the mental processes involved in testifying. Extraordinary experiences occur-
ring after the testimonial event may affect memory or communication.
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not be aware of such effects. 224
4. Should the Expert Testimony be Excluded Pursuant to Rule
403?
Some consideration of the application of Rule 403 to expert testi-
mony on credibility is appropriate.225 All relevant evidence is pre-
sumptively admissible.2 6 A Rule 403 objection only arises after the
evidence has been found relevant and admissible under Rule 702.
The limitations on expert testimony imposed by Rule 702 cover
much of the ground included in Rule 403.227 A ruling that expert
testimony on credibility is admissible under Rule 702 presupposes
that the court has determined there is evidence sufficient to support
findings that: (1) the witness is an expert; (2) the testimony is based
upon a correct application of valid scientific principles; and, (3) the
evidence may help the jury assess the credibility of the subject
witness.
The most common ground for invoking Rule 403 is exclusion of
unfairly prejudicial evidence. It is difficult to imagine otherwise ad-
missible expert testimony on credibility which is unfairly prejudi-
cial.22 The basis of the expert opinion is a different matter. Rule
403 may be invoked to exclude the basis of the opinion. State v.
Woodburn229 provides an example. On voir dire Dr. Sobchuk testi-
fied about sexual fantasies and lies the boy told him. The trial jus-
tice was concerned about Dr. Sobchuk's testimony concerning these
incidents. "We deal first with the problem under Rule 404(b), 5 ° that
evidence of other-and I omit crimes-but other wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith."231 The trial justice con-
224. See, e.g., State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984) (error to exclude testi-
mony concerning studies of higher incidence of abuse by parents who were victims of
abuse as children).
225. FED. R. Evm. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." M.R. Evid. 403 is identical
as is the version enacted by most states adopting a version of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
226. FED. R. EvuD. 402.
227. The pertinent text of Rule 702 appears supra at text accompanying note 60.
228. See the discussion of State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983),
supra text accompanying note 188.
229. 559 A.2d 343 (Me. 1989).
230. See M.R. Evid. 404(b), supra note 31. The first sentence is identical to the
first sentence of the federal counterpart. The federal version contains a second sen-
tence noting such evidence is not inadmissible when offered for other purposes.
Maine omitted the second sentence as unnecessary. M.R. Evid. 404 adviser's note; B.
FIELD & P. MURRAY, MAUM EVIDENCE 104-105 (2d ed. 1987).
231. Transcript, supra note 10, at 351.
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cluded the evidence was not excludable under either Rule 404(b) or
Rule 702.232 The justice then said, "the trial judge has his usual dis-
cretion to exclude under Rule 403 opinions, the probative value of
which is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
or confusion or which would tend to be a waste of time.'"
The court sustained the state's objection under Rule 403. A Rule
403 analysis weighing the probative value of the testimony as the
basis for the opinion was appropriate. The court could limit or en-
tirely exclude the testimony if it found the risk of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighed its probative value.2 3' Such a finding does
not, however, justify excluding the opinion itself. The basis of an
expert's opinion is admissible because it is relevant to the credibility
of that opinion. Rule 705 permits experts to testify without prior
disclosure of the basis for their opinions or inferences. 2 5 The court
may exclude the basis of the expert's conclusion from evidence
under Rule 403. Such a ruling does not affect the scientific validity
of the opinion.236 If the opinion is admissible under Rule 702, and
not excludable under Rule 403 in its own right, it is admissible. The
reverse is not always true. If the opinion is excluded under Rule 403,
its basis is no longer admissible under Rule 703. The basis of an
excluded opinion is admissible only if it is independently relevant
and admissible in its own right.23
232. Id. The trial justice's conclusion that the evidence was admisible under Rule
404(b) was correct. The defendant did not offer Dr. Sobchul'a testimony as evidence
of the boy's character. It was offered as part of the basis underlying the doctor's
diagnosis and explanation of the effects on the boy. The majority of the Law Court
reached the opposite and incorrect opinion.
233. Transcript, supra note 10, at 352.
234. The trial justice apparently felt Rule 404(b) suggested the "unfaimess" of
the prejudicial impact. After the court ruled, defense counsel asked what testimony
the court was excluding. The trial justice responded. "As long as it does not pertain
to specific acts so that we get right back into the Rule 404 problem again." Id.
235. The substance of the Maine and federal rules are identical on this point.
Both permit inquiry into the underlying facts and data on cross-examination. Under
both rules, the court may require disclosure of the basis before the opinion. The
Maine rule contains a second subsection specifying the procedure for objection and
voir dire by the opponent before the expert states her opinions to the jury.
236. It will, of course, ultimately affect the jury's assessment of the weight to be
given the expert's testimony. Justice Horby reached the same result by a different
route in his dissent in Woodburn: "The specific incidents on which the opinion was
based would be admissible only on cross-examination." State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d
343, 349 n.7 (Me. 1989) (citing M.R. Evid. 608(b), Evidence Of Character And Con-
duct Of Witness; Specific Instances of Conduct.). M.R. Evid. 608(b) is identical to its
federal counterpart Justice Homby's analysis is consistent with a determination that
Dr. Sobchuk's testimony is character evidence. However, Dr. Sobchuk's testimony
was not character evidence.
237. The trial court in Woodburn reached this result as to some items of the basis
underlying Dr. Sobchuk's diagnosis. The trial justice said he would permit Dr.
Sobchuk to testify concerning any statements the boy made which were inconsistent
with his testimony at trial. Transcript, supra note 10, at 357. Defense counsel wished
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Rule 403 also permits exclusion of evidence when necessary to
avoid an extraordinary danger of misleading the jury or creating
confusion over the issues. Ordinarily the risk that jurors will misun-
derstand the purpose of an expert's testimony offered on credibility
is minimal. In State v. Anaya23 8 the defense offered expert testi-
mony on the effects of the battered spouse syndrome. The trial jus-
tice excluded the evidence, in part because he felt it was more likely
to confuse the jury than help it.2 39 The Law Court found the exclu-
sion was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The credibility of
the subject witness was the central issue in the case. The Law Court
properly suggested that the probative value of testimony on this is-
sue cannot be substantially outweighed by the risk that it will lead
to confusion. 4 0 There are several reasons compelling this conclusion.
Pragmatically, the "helpfulness" analysis under Rule 702 effec-
tively predetermines the issue. It is unlikely the trial judge will con-
clude that the testimony will help the jury resolve a material issue,
and then decide the jurors will not be able to understand the evi-
dence or its purpose. Furthermore, exclusion on this ground risks
underestimation of the jurors' collective ability to understand the
evidence. Finally, even if the jury proves incapable of understanding
the evidence, it is unlikely that their difficulty will affect the verdict.
Jurors are likely to ignore testimony they do not understand, espe-
cially if it is counterintuitive.
2 4 1
to elicit testimony concerning "other problems" the boy discussed with Dr. Sobchuk,
offering this testimony as evidence of the boy's trust in and candor with Dr. Sobchuk.
Counsel argued this evidence tended to make it more probable the boy would have
mentioned any abuse by his father. The trial justice stated, "I am going to accept
that line of questioning as a form of attacking the credibility ... of the witness. Now
if you wish to argue further and snatch defeat from the mouth of victory, just keep
talking." Transcript, supra note 10, at 358.
238. 438 A.2d at 892. The facts and holdings in Anaya are discussed supra notes
210-17 and accompanying text.
239. Id. at 893. Whether the trial court was concerned with the jury's ability to
understand the testimony or with possible misapplication is not clear.
240. Id. at 894.
241. Courts occasionally leap past Rule 702 to exclude evidence under Rule 403.
See, e.g., State v. Russell, 571 A.2d 229 (Me. 1990). The defense offered generalized
testimony about the effects of interview techniques commonly used by social workers
and police when interviewing suspected victims of child abuse. The trial court ex-
cluded the testimony. The Law Court affirmed, finding no evidence of the techniques
actually used to interview the child. Id. at 230. Absent such evidence the proffered
testimony could not help the jury assess the child's credibility. The expert's testi-
mony should be excluded because it failed to meet the requirements of Rule 702. The
trial justice, however, excluded the evidence based on Rule 403 because the testimony
"would entirely change the focus of the trial from what happened in this case to the
way in which the investigation was carried out." Id. The Law Court agreed: "His
testimony, if admitted, would have created a trial within the trial." Id. at 231. Both
statements imply the testimony would confuse, distract, and mislead the jury. These
observations are only true in the sense that credibility of contested evidence on a key
issue always creates a "trial within a trial." The credibility of the victim was the issue
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Rule 403 considerations of judicial economy 2 are also duplicative
of the helpfulness analysis required by Rule 702. The advisory com-
mittee's note to Rule 702 suggests that helpful expert testimony is
never a waste of time. "When [expert] opinions are excluded, it is
because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of
time."2 3 Generally, helpful expert testimony on credibility should
not be excluded under the judicial economy mandate of Rule 403.
Rule 403 does, however, suggest an additional basis for finding such
testimony a "waste of time": Where the probative value of the sub-
ject witness's testimony is so slight that it will not justify the time
required to present the expert testimony.
B. The Persistence of Myth, Judicial Anxiety Closets, and
Related Matters
In the preceding section, the requirements for admission of expert
testimony on credibility, and the grounds for excluding such evi-
dence under Rule 403, were considered. Courts have continued to
exclude such evidence on other grounds. The most frequent grounds
for exclusion are: (1) the expert's testimony invades the province of
the jury; (2) a fear that jurors will abdicate their duties as finders of
fact; (3) the need to avoid unfair surprise; and (4) avoiding a battle
of the experts. None of these grounds is a valid basis for excluding
expert evidence under the Rules of Evidence. These mythical four
horsemen of exclusion will be discussed in this section. Finally, the
Law Court's conclusion in State v. Woodburn2" that Dr. Sobchuk's
testimony was impermissible character evidence will be considered.
1. Invading the Province of the Jury
This ground for exclusion is simply a legal fantasy. The "province
of the jury" is a mythical land. Like Camelot, Brigadoon, and Garri-
son Keillor's Lake Woebegone, the Province of the Jury cannot be
found on any map. Its undefined borders are free to expand and
contract to meet the needs of its appointed defenders. "The mist the
gods drew about them on the battlefield before Troy was no more
dense than the one enshrouding the origins of the rule.1240
in the case. Certainly the court approved exploration and argument of the same issue
by more traditional means. Id. at 231 n.1.
242. "Relevant evidence may be excluded by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403.
243. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note (quoting 7 J. WIG!A OR EvmENcn
iN TRALS AT COMMON LAw § 1918 (rev. ed. 1979)).
244. 559 A.2d 343 (Me. 1989).
245. Stoebuck, Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status Trends and A Note of Cau-
tion, 41 DN. L CT. J. 226 (1964). Professor Stoebuck's research found the earliest
application of the rule to be in Davis v. Fuller, 12 Vt. 178 (1840). Davis was followed
by decisions in 1856, 1863, and 1874 from Louisiana, New York, and Iowa respec-
tively. Marcy v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 11 La. Ann. 748, 749 (1856); Perse & Brooks
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Whatever its origin, the "province of the jury" rule was adopted in
every jurisdiction save New Hampshire.2 4s Notwithstanding its al-
most universal adoption it appears no one ever bothered to define
the phrase. 47 Defined or not, for almost a century the term has been
offered as justification for excluding evidence. The simple fact, how-
ever, is that only the judge can invade the province of the jury by
taking the case out of the jury's hands. The admission of evidence
cannot impinge on the jury's decision-making power.
This [argument] is untenable because the witness is not attempt-
ing to invade the province of the court or jury but merely to put
before them a piece of evidence. Moreover, he could not invade
their province if he desired. The court will declare the law and the
jury cannot be compelled to accept the witness' testimony on any
proposition.
2 48
As the twentieth century progressed, the myth was under attack.
Dean Wigmore characterized the rule as "empty rhetoric. 2 49 Al-
though Dean Wigmore's considerable influence was not enough to
cause abandonment of the rule, his criticism did encourage adoption
of a new label. References to "the ultimate issue" began to replace
"province of the jury" in commentaries and opinions.250 There was
progress on more substantive grounds as a number of courts aban-
doned the rule. 252
Paper Works v. Willett, 24 N.Y. Super. Ct. (1 Rob.) 131 (1863); Muldowney v. Illinois
Cent. Ry., 39 Iowa 615, 622 (1874). These early cases simply enunciated the rule with-
out citation or discussion, implying the rule was already accepted as a legal common-
place. Stoebuck, supra, at 227.
246. Id. at 228.
247. The editors of WORDS AND PHRASES list no cases defining "the province of the
jury." Similarly the editors of BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) included no
entry for "province of the jury" or "invading the province of the jury." There is one
entry under "invades the province of the jury." 22A WORDS AND PHRASES (Supp.
1990-91). In 1961 Justice McNeill, writing for the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, was
faced with trying to determine the meaning of an objection:
An objection to evidence should be so clear and specific that the Judge may
immediately understand the point raised. An objection using an expression
which may mean one or more of several specific complaints is usually too
general .... So we think was the effect of the objection that the witness's
testimony would "invade the province of the jury."
Hooten v. Dunbar, 347 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (citing Moore v.
Knemeyer, 271 S.W. 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)). Judge McNeil noted the phrase was
often used to indicate the evidence going directly to the "point the jury is to decide."
Id. Apparently, this is as close as an American court has ever come to defining the
term.
248. C. McCoRMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 627, at 787 (1937). See
also J. WIMoRE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 127(b)(1) (1935).
249. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMON LAW § 1920 (rev. ed. 1979).
250. Dean Wigmore is credited with suggesting the phrase "usurping the function
of the jury," which also began to replace "invading the province of the jury." 3 D.
LouisELL & C. MuELL.R, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 394, at 689 (1979).
251. By 1964, Professor Stoebuck's research indicated that the ban on opinion
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Adoption of Rule 704 was intended to toll the death knell of the
rule.152 As is often the case, however, it is easier to enact rules than
change articles of judicial faith.25 3
Woodburn provides an example of the concept's persistence. The
trial justice excluded Dr. Sobchuk's testimony because it "borders so
closely upon the testimony on the ultimate issue as to the credibility
of [the boy]. . . ." The trial justice acknowledged the mandate of
Rule 704, but felt "it is discretionary with the trial judge as to
whether or not opinion on the ultimate issue will be allowed.1 "
There is nothing in the text of the rule or the adviser's notes to
suggest the rule vests the trial court with such discretion. 211 The
Law Court's opinion in Woodburn does not directly hold this finding
in error. The majority simply noted: "If otherwise admissible, M.R.
Evid. 704 provides for the admissibility of testimony in the form of
an opinion on an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury....
The court went on, however, to find "Sobchuk's testimony demon-
testimony relating to the ultimate fact had been abandoned entirely by four, and
probably five, states as well as by the Fourth Circuit. Stoebuck, supra note 245, at
227-28. The First Circuit had also said, in dicta, it would abandon the rule. The
United States Supreme Court, two other circuits, and ten states had acknowledged an
exception permitting expert testimony on an ultimate fact. This is an "exception
[which] nearly eats up the rule." Id. at 230-31. Another two circuits and twelve states
had adopted the same exception, but limited its application to cases where the jury
was "not qualified" to form the opinion. Finally, eight other states (including Maine)
and the Seventh Circuit had relaxed the prohibition on such testimony in one fashion
or another. Id. at 227-36. See United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir.
1969) as an example of a court which avoided use of the phrase, but applied the rule.
252. FED. R Evm. 704 advisory committee's note (citing 7 J. Wimo. EvmFzNCE
IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAw § 1920 (rev. ed. 1979)).
The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit
them when helpful to the trier of fact. In order to render this approach
fully effective and to allay any doubt on the subject, the so-called "ultimate
issue" rule is specifically abolished by the instant rule.
The older cases often contained strictures against allowing witnes to
express opinions upon ultimate issues .... The basis usually assigned for
the rule [is] to prevent the witness from "usurping the province of thejury"....
Id.
253. The 1990 supplement to Annotation, Necessity and Admissibility of Expert
Testimony as to Credibility of Witness, 20 A.L.R.3d 684 (1968), lists 35 cases from 18
states and the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits as "supporting exclusion of expert
testimony on credibility as an invasion of the jury's province." Id. § 13 (Supp. 1990).
The listed cases were decided between 1982 and 1989 and include State v. Kim, 64
Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982). In the author's judgment, this case cannot be con-
strued as supporting a ban on "invasions of the jury's province." See also State v.
Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1989). For a typical case adhering to the
anti-invasion rule notwithstanding adoption of evidentiary rules paralleling the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, see State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
254. Transcript, supra note 10, at 351.
255. The Maine and federal versions of Rule 704 are identical in this regard.
256. State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343. 345 (Me. 1989).
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strates no scientifically accepted basis for determining that the child
was unable to distinguish truth from falsehood .... Thus, the trial
court could properly determine that the testimony did not meet the
requirements of M.R. Evid. 702, and, therefore, was inadmissible
under M.R. Evid. 704. "1257 The court suggests that Rule 704 is a ba-
sis for exclusion of evidence. It is not.
Rule 704 is clear. "[T]he worry about invading the province of the
jury has been solved for us by the provisions of Rule 704... which
permits opinion testimony even though it 'embraces an ultimate is-
sue.' "258 Rule 704 is a rule of inclusion, not exclusion. The court
may not exclude opinion evidence because it is probative of credibil-
ity. There is no special category for evidence which invades the
province of the jury, usurps the function of the jury, or embraces an
ultimate issue. It is to be treated the same as any other evidence.2
19
"[A]n expert's opinion does not invade the province of the jury. It is
merely offered as any other evidence, with the expert subject to
cross-examination and the jury left to determine its weight."200
2. Impressionability of the Jury
This ground for excluding expert opinions on credibility is simply
concern about "invading the province of the jury" viewed through
the other end of the telescope. The focus is simply shifted from a
perceived mandate to defend the jury, to anxiety over the conse-
quences of failing to protect the jury. Like most fears, it is best to
approach this anxiety indirectly. For instance, appraisers testify
every day, giving opinions on the value of real estate, art, jewelry,
and other items of personal property. Actuaries predict life expec-
tancies. Economists predict a lifetime's earnings. There is little judi-
cial concern that jurors will abdicate their responsibilities to the ap-
praisers, actuaries, and economists. 261 Why assume the result would
be any different as to opinions on factors affecting credibility?
Research by the behavioral scientists suggests the fear that juries
257. Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
258. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 292, 660 P.2d 1208, 1219 (1983).
259. The amendment adding paragraph (b) to FED. R. EvW. 704 does create a lim-
ited exception excluding such evidence. The very existence of the amendment argues
that the rules contemplate that expert testimony on credibility be treated no differ-
ently than expert testimony on any other issue.
260. State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982). Compare
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
261. Nor is any tendency towards wholesale abdication of decision-making by ju.
rors apparent in such cases. Jurors tend to listen attentively to the experts. Ulti-
mately they retire to make their own decision. In the author's experience the majority
of juries return verdicts reflecting some value between those set by the competing
expert witnesses. Tax Court judges have the same reaction. Pies & Fischer, Special
Report: Why Not Court Appointed Experts?, 40 TAx Nors 303 (July 18, 1988).
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will abdicate their responsibility is illusory. 6 2 Experience also sug-
gests the fear of jury abdication to the expert is more illusory than
real. First, jurors are sentient beings having a normal allotment of
human ego. While they may serve reluctantly, few fail to take their
duty seriously. Fewer still are willing to abdicate their decision-mak-
ing authority to mere witnesses, expert or not. Second, our adver-
sary process virtually insures the jury will be made aware of any
doubt concerning the validity of the expert's testimony. If other ex-
perts might reach a different conclusion, the opponent may provide
the jury the benefit of an opposing view. Third, verdicts are the re-
sult of a group decision. One juror might be tempted to blindly fol-
low the suggestions of the forensic expert. It is unlikely, however,
that all, or even a majority, of the other jurors will do so. The
residual risk, if any, of wholesale abdication is of the type normally
handled through proper instruction of the jury by the trial court.0 3
A Massachusetts jury provides an example. The jurors refused to
accept uncontroverted scientific proof of a defendant's innocence
even when presented by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation. The victim was raped by a stranger and identified the de-
fendant as the man who assaulted her. Two blood tests and DNA
typing performed by the F.B.I. proved the defendant could not have
been the rapist. The jury returned a verdict of guilty.
The verdict ... stunned even the prosecutor ... who acknowl-
edged that he had "fully anticipated a not guilty" ruling based on
the DNA profile.
The DNA results prompted prosecutors to offer Hammond a
deal. ... [The defendant's attorney] said Hammond refused the
deal because he figured he had nothing to fear at trial
"He was innocent," [defendant's lawyer] said. "He thought the
truth would set him free.' 28
262. See Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making:
An Empirical Analysis, 7 BxzAv. SCL & L 215 (1989) (Jurors not exposed to expert
testimony on the subject were insensitive to factors affecting the accuracy of eyewit-
ness identification. The addition of appropriate expert testimony improved juror sen-
sitivity to the issue. Significantly, however, the expert testimony created no increase
in juror skepticism about the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.). See Wells, Lindsay,
& Tousignant, Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in
Judging the Validity of Eye Witness Testimony, 4 LAw & Hum BnaAv. 275 (1980).
See also Lindsay, Lim, Marando & Cully, supra note 184.
263. See United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
264. Holher, Jury Finds Guilt in Rape Case Despite DNA Test, Boston Sun.
Globe, April 8, 1990, at 65, col 3. The final outcome of other cases discused in this
article also supports the conclusion that juries will often disregard the expert. The
defendants were convicted on retrial after remand requiring the admission of expert
testimony on credibility in United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1987),
appeal after remand 869 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied 874 F.2d 812 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied110 S. Ct. 1110 (1990), discussed supra notes 118-27 and accompa-
nying text; State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983), discussed supra
notes 188-97 and accompanying text; State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981), appeal
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Since the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, usurpation argu-
ments are often raised under Rule 403. The argument, however, re-
mains without merit:
The State argues that there would have been little probative
value to the witness' testimony [concerning the effect of extreme
stress on the ability to later identify persons involved] and a great
danger of unfair prejudice. The latter problem is claimed to arise
from the fact that [Dr.] Loftus' qualifications were so impressive
that the jury might have given improper weight to her testimony.
We do not believe that this raises the issue of unfair prejudice.2 6
3. Avoiding Unfair Surprise
The third mythical horseman of exclusion rides upon the trial
lawyer's fear of ambush. Modern discovery rules have, however, ef-
fectively eliminated ambush by experts from the competent lawyer's
litany of real worries. The Federal Civil and Criminal Rules of Pro-
cedure both provide effective discovery tools designed to insure that
no party need come to court unprepared to meet the testimony of
his opponent's expert. 66
4. Avoiding a "Battle of the Experts"
This is perhaps the most mysterious of the grounds for exclusion.
Our system of jurisprudence is dedicated to the proposition that
truth is best discovered through an adversarial presentation of evi-
dence. Opinion testimony by expert witnesses is an accepted part of
the common law trial. Indeed, in most professional negligence cases,
expert testimony is essential to the claim.
267
Furthermore, it is passingly strange to find a sudden desire to
avoid an adversarial presentation of testimony whether lay or expert
about credibility or any other subject. Nevertheless, this argument
was advanced as the rationale supporting the 1984 amendment to
Rule 704 excluding expert testimony on whether or not a criminal
defendant had the requisite mental state. "The purpose of this
amendment is to eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing ex-
pert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory conclusions as to
the ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier of fact.12068
after remand 456 A.2d 1255 (Me. 1983), discussed supra notes 210-17 and accompa-
nying text.
265. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 292, 660 P.2d at 1219.
266. FED. . CIrv. P. 26; FED. R. Cm. P. 16.
267. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1982); Waatti v. Mar-
quette General Hospital, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 526 (Mich. App. 1983); Marshall v.
Tomaselli, 372 A.2d 1280 (R.I. 1977); Parker v. Vanderbilt Univ., 767 S.W.2d 412
(Tenn. App. 1988).
268. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., lat Sess.
230-31 (1983), reprinted in 3 J. WEiNSTEiN & M. BERGER, WaINSTEIN's EVIDENcE 704-1
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Why the sudden aversion to the adversary system? Whatever the
reason, the logic of the argument does not bear close examination.
Every jury is confronted with the spectacle of contradictory evi-
dence or interpretations of evidence. Such a spectacle may be con-
fusing, but it is also the sole reason jurors are summoned to court.
Nor does the amendment eliminate contradictory testimony by ex-
perts. If the experts hold contradictory opinions, one would assume
they have reached different diagnoses or, at least, hold contradictory
opinions on "the characteristics of [the] disease or defect."200
Whatever the wisdom of Fed. R. Evid. 704(b), it adds to our in-
quiry. The amendment was necessary to exclude expert testimony
on this "ultimate legal issue. '270 It was necessary because, seemly or
not, the Rules of Evidence offer no other basis for avoiding the bat-
tle of experts on this or any other relevant issue which is a proper
subject for expert testimony.
5. Is the Testimony Impermissible Character Evidence?
This Article began with the trial of Mr. Woodburn. It is appropri-
ate to conclude by returning to consider the decision of his appeal.
The Law Court affirmed his conviction. The court ultimately did not
base its decision on any of the grounds discussed so far, holding in-
stead that Dr. Sobchuk's testimony was impermissible character
evidence.271
Justice Horby believed the result was "fundamentally unfair, ' 272
but was forced to conclude: "Dr. Sobchuk's testimony is inadmissi-
ble under the Maine Rules of Evidence [because] the Rules simply
(1990), amending FED. R. Evro. 704. "Legal issue" as used here should not be confused
with an "issue of law." No amendment was necessary to preclude psychologists and
psychiatrists from rendering opinions on issues of law. Psychiatrists and psychologists
are not competent to render legal opinions. Nor is the jury asked to decide the de-
fendant's mental state as a legal issue. The court provides the jury with the legal
definition of the requisite mental state in terms the jurors can understand and apply
to the facts. The issue is put to the jury not as a question of law, but as a question of
fact. Rule 704, as originally enacted, did not permit psychologists or psychiatrists to
tell the jury what the law held to be the requisite mental state. The original rule did
permit the expert to explain her findings in terms of the legal criteria provided to the
jury. This does not require legal expertise. It is precisely what we ask the lay jury to
do. See, e.g., State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983); State v. Wil-
loughby, 507 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Me. 1986); State v. Flick, 425 A.2d 167, 170-71 (Me.
1981). In any event, it is this aspect of the doctor's testimony which the language of
FED. R. Evm. 704(b) excludes.
269. "Under this proposal, expert psychiatric testimony would be limited to
presenting and explaining (the] diagnoses, such as whether the defendant had a se-
vere mental disease or defect and what the characteristics of such a disease or defect,
if any, may have been." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 268.
270. Id.
271. State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343 (Me. 1989).
272. Id. at 349 (Horby, J., dissenting).
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do not permit opinion testimony on credibility. 27 3
The Maine rules permit proof of a person's character only by evi-
dence of reputation. They do not follow the federal example of also
permitting opinion testimony as evidence of character. 27 4 Maine's
decision to exclude opinion testimony as evidence of character, how-
ever, does not justify the conclusion that its Rules of Evidence "do
not permit opinion testimony on credibility."27 5
The common law in the United States permitted proof of charac-
ter for truthfulness by evidence of reputation from an early date.270
Before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence many jurisdictions
expanded the common law rule to permit opinion testimony as evi-
dence of a witness's character.277 The Federal Rules of Evidence in-
corporated this expansion of the common law rule. The drafters of
the Maine rule, however, chose not to follow the federal example of
permitting opinion testimony on character.
There is some justification for [the federal approach of allowing
opinion testimony], since the jury is likely to think that a witness
who says that the defendant's reputation is good is in fact vouching
for him. There is, however, the risk that wholesale allowance of
opinion testimony would tend to turn a trial into a swearing con-
test between conflicting character witnesses.2 7 8
This reasoning parallels that offered to justify the exclusion of ex-
pert testimony on credibility in order to avoid a "battle of experts."
Justice Hornby suggested it was time to reassess Maine's decision to
exclude opinion testimony on character. The federal experience and
273. Id. at 347.
274. M.R. Evid. 608(a) provides in part. "The credibility of a witness may be at-
tacked or supported by evidence of reputation .... The corresponding portion of
FED. R. Evw. 608 states: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported
by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation . . . ." (emphasis added). The
Maine and federal versions of Rule 405, Methods of Proving Character, reflect the
same difference. L,,-
This is not a parochial issue. Maine is not alone in confining proof of character to
reputation evidence. The issue is also of interest to those jurisdictions permitting
opinion evidence of character. If the Law Court's analysis is correct, lay opinion testi-
mony about credibility is potentially admissible in those jurisdictions following the
federal lead. The psychologist's and psychiatrist's medical expertise is no longer ma-
terial, nor is the validity of the theory underlying their opinion because Rule 702 is
no longer applicable. Lay opinion testimony is controlled by Rule 701, which requires
that the opinion be "rationally based on the perception of the witness" and be helpful
to the jury.
275. State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d at 347 (Hornby, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
276. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRiALS AT COMMON LAW § 1985 (rev. ed. 1979).
277. Id. The courts in England tunnelled from the opposite side of the mountain,
permitting proof of character by opinion evidence from an early date. Permitting rep-
utation evidence was a later innovation. Id. at §§ 1980-82.
278. M.R. Evid. 405 advisers' note, reprinted in R. FIELD & P. MURRAY, MAINE
EVMENCE 114 (2d ed. 1987).
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that of states adopting the same course suggested the concerns of
Maine's drafters were largely groundless.2 70
The Inhabitants of Phillips v. The Inhabitants of Kingfield,30
decided in 1841, was cited as the source of Maine's decision to ex-
clude opinion evidence as proof of character. 81 The facts underlying
the case have a thoroughly modem ring.
It appeared that [Mr.] Wood was much absent from his wife and
family, and that in the year 1820 ... he being absent, laboring
from home, a small amount of supplies was furnished by the over-
seers of the poor of the town of Kingfield, where she then was
found in destitute circumstances. 2
The town sought to recover the cost of the supplies provided to
Mrs. Wood. The sole factual issue was the location of Mr. Wood's
residence at the relevant time. The plaintiff called Mr. Wood as a
witness. A defense witness believed Mr. Wood was untrustworthy.
On appeal the Law Court held the defense witness's testimony to be
inadmissible. What tends to be overlooked, however, is that the
court rejected only lay opinions.
The rule, as stated by Swift, is more satisfactory and less liable
to abuse in practice. He says the only proper questions to be asked
are, whether he knows the general character of the witness in point
of truth among his neighbors, and what that character is, whether
good or bad. And states, that his testimony must be founded on the
common repute as to truth, and not as to honesty.
One acquires a character for truth or the reverse .... And it is
this trait of character as a fact, that should be placed before a jury
for their consideration in weighing the testimony. The opinions of
a witness are not legal testimony except in special cases; such, for
example, as experts in some profession or art .... In other cases,
the witness is not to substitute his opinion for that of the jury;, nor
are they to rely upon any such opinion instead of exercising their
own judgment, taking into consideration the whole testimony."
Phillips v. Kingfield held that lay witnesses are incompetent to
give their opinion of a person's character. The case is an early exam-
ple of what Dean Wigmore described as the "historical blunder" of
the lay opinion rule.28 Lay opinions were inadmissible. Lay persons
were only competent to testify as to the fact of a person's reputa-
279. State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d at 347 (Hornby, J., dissenting).
280. 19 Me. 375 (1841).
281. The Maine advisers' note to M.R. Evid. 608(a) does not cite Phillips. The
Note does, however, parallel the reasoning of Phillips.
282. Phillips v. Kingfield, 19 Me. at 376.
283. Id. at 378-79 (emphasis added) (citing Swn 's Ev. 143).
284. J. WirMoRE, A SnuDm'S' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAw OF EvmH~cz § 127 (1935).
See also 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE n TRIL AT CoMMoN LAw § 1986 (rev. ed. 1979),
citing Phillips as an example of an "opinion rule" case relied upon to justify exclu-
sion of lay opinions on a witness's character for truthfulness.
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tion. Opinion testimony was limited to the expert witness.285
State v. Woodburn was not the first time the Maine court had
cause to consider the admissibility of expert testimony on "character
traits." The issue arose in State v. Arnold.
2 8
In Arnold, the Law Court affirmed the exclusion of psychological
testimony about the defendant's character for truthfulness and
peacefulness. The defendant admitted that the proffered testimony
was character evidence. He argued that Maine Rule of Evidence
405(a) merely permitted reputation evidence, but did not preclude
other methods of proof.2s7 The Law Court rejected this interpreta-
tion, holding that evidence of reputation was the sole means of prov-
ing character. No other type of evidence would be admitted as proof
of a person's character. s" Maine's refusal to include opinion testi-
mony in its version of Rule 405(a) reflected
a generalized determination by the Supreme Judicial Court that, at
least at present, a purported expert psychological evaluation of any
human being's character or character traits is not sufficiently relia-
ble to be relevant. So read, Rule 405(a) precludes the possibility
that a particular trial judge, purporting to act in accordance with
our analysis in State v. Williams, might find such expert testimony
"sufficiently reliable to be held relevant. ' ' 28 9
285. Reputation evidence is, of course, nothing more than an anthology of lay
opinions gratuitously published by one's neighbors. The court's preference for reputa-
tion evidence is based on an interesting premise.
The observations of Justices Gibson and Duncan, in the case of Kinmel v.
Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336, are just and appropriate. Mr. Justice Gibson says:
"there is danger from the proneness so often observable in witnesses, to
substitute their own opinion for that of the public, whose judgement can-
not be so readily warped by prejudice or feeling as that of the individual
Phillips v. Kingfield, 19 Me. at 379-80 (emphasis added). Whether individuals are
more prone to "prejudice or feeling" than the public is open to debate. See also Pro-
fessor Mainsterberg's account of his experience with the public and press of Chicago,
supra note 48.
286. 421 A.2d 932 (Me. 1980).
287. Id. at 937.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 938 n.5 (quoting State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978)). The foot-
note suggests a final judgment on the behavioral sciences. It is unclear upon what
evidence the court concluded the behavioral sciences not only lacked "sufficient relia-
bility," but was certain that they were unlikely to achieve it in the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, the codification of this conclusion will make it difficult to bring the
issue before the Law Court for reconsideration. If trial courts are precluded from
considering the issue, the parties will be precluded from offering any evidence demon-
strating that the psychological findings have advanced to the point that they are now
"sufficiently reliable." There is a certain irony in the court's citation to its earlier
decision in Williams. In Williams the Maine court rejected the Frye test of general
acceptance within the pertinent field as the sole basis for determining validity of a
scientific theory. Williams has been widely praised as reflecting a needed openness to
new scientific information which may enhance the courts' pursuit of truth. The Frye
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In Woodburn, Justice Hornby interpreted Arnold as banning all
opinion evidence offered on credibility.2 °0 This conclusion is not
supported by the holding in Arnold, nor is it required by the Rules
of Evidence.
Woodburn stands in sharp contrast to the decision of Judge God-
dard thirty years earlier in the second perjury trial of Alger Hiss.2 0'
The government accused Mr. Hiss of lying to a grand jury inquiring
into charges he passed classified documents to Whittaker Chambers.
The government's case hinged primarily upon the testimony of Mr.
Chambers. During the second trial the defense wished to call a psy-
chiatrist who was prepared to testify that Mr. Chambers was a soci-
opath. The government objected, presenting Judge Goddard with a
novel issue in the midst of a highly publicized case.
Since the use of psychiatric testimony to impeach the credibility
of a witness is a comparatively modern innovation, there appears
[sic] to be no federal cases dealing with this precise question. How-
ever, the importance of insanity on the question of credibility of
witnesses is often stressed. There are some State cases in which
such testimony has been held to be admissible ....
Expert testimony of this character was excluded in State v.
Driver. The Court's reasoning seemed to be based upon the theory
that the witness was to be regarded as a character witness who
could only testify as to reputation and not as to his personal
opinion. The Court indicated that it would not allow him to be
qualified as an expert. This was in 1921-before the value of psy-
chiatry had been recognized.
... [E]vidence concerning the credibility of the witness is un-
doubtedly relevant and material and under the circumstances in
this case, and in view of the foundation which has been laid, I
think should be received.2 02
There is no gainsaying the fact the Maine court has established a
conclusive presumption that science has no "sufficiently reliable"
means of establishing an individual's character.2 0 3 This does not,
however, mandate the result in Woodburn2" The question remains,
what is "character. 29 5
and Williams cases are discussed supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
290. State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d at 347 (Homby, J., dissenting).
291. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
292. Id. at 559-60 (citing State v. Driver, 88 W. Va. 479, 107 SE. 189 (1921)).
293. State v. Arnold, 421 A.2d 932 (Me. 1980).
294. State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343 (Me. 1989).
295. This issue also arises in jurisdictions permitting opinion testimony on a wit-
ness's character for truthfulness. In State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1339 n.14 (Haw.
1982), the court found no distinction between character evidence and an expert's
opinion that a witness's statements were true. Kim holds such testimony is character
evidence under Rule 608(a) only to the extent the expert expresses an opinion on
whether a specific statement by a witness is true. Opinions about possible or actual
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"Character" has many definitions in the English language. When
used to describe an individual, it is defined as "[t]he combined
moral or ethical structure of a person or group,. . . [m]oral or ethi-
cal strength; integrity; fortitude .. ,,.1s Courts have rendered simi-
lar definitions of "character." "'Character' is a generalized descrip-
tion of one's disposition in respect to a general trait such as honesty,
temperance, or carefulness .... ,,297 "Character" has also been de-
scribed as "the complex of accustomed mental and moral character-
istics and habitual ethical traits marking a person."2"" Dean Wig-
more commented: "Thus, in discrediting an assertion, we may
appeal... not only to defects in specified qualities whose minimum
existence is required for admitting the assertion, but also to the
qualities of moral character .... ,299
"Character," as used in Rule 608, describes the moral or ethical
principles a person appears to follow in the conduct of his or her
life. There is a distinction between a person's adherence to ethical or
moral values, and the scientific study of factors affecting human per-
ception, memory, and communication. The distinction is equally
clear when juxtaposed to the diagnosis and effects of mental or emo-
tional disease.300
errors in perception, memory, or communication are not considered evidence of char-
acter. Id. at 1338.
Six years after its decision in Kim the Hawaii Supreme Court decided State v.
Castro, 756 P.2d 1033 (Haw. 1988). In Castro the court analyzed the relationship
between evidence of prior bad acts and evidence of a defendant's character. It ruled
on the admissibility of expert testimony on credibility without mentioning any rela-
tionship to character evidence under Rule 608.
296. The American Heritage Dictionary (2d coll. ed. 1982).
297. Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 1971).
Character has also become a legal word of art in many jurisdictions. A large num-
ber of courts have long considered "character" and "reputation" synonymous as used
within the law of evidence. See, e.g., Knode v. Williamson, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 586, 588
(1873); Stewart v. United States, 104 F.2d 234, 235 (1939); Garrison v. State, 217 Ala.
322, 116 So. 705 (1928); Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 306, 162 P.2d
133, 139 (1945); Clark v. State, 52 Ga. App. 254, 255, 183 S.E. 92, 92 (1935); Waine v.
State, 37 Md. App. 222, 244, 377 A.2d 509, 522 (1977); People v. DeLano, 318 Mich.
557, 577, 28 N.W.2d 909, 917 (1947); People v. Hinksman, 192 N.Y. 421, 430, 85 N.E.
676, 680 (1908); State v. Sing, 114 Ore. 267, 291, 229 P. 921, 928 (1924), reh'g denied
229 P. 921 (1925); Rogers v. State, 126 Tex. Cr. R. 39, 41, 70 S.W.2d 188, 189 (1934);
Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 871, 55 S.E.2d 24, 29 (1949).
This usage resulted from the common law rule, still honored in Maine, limiting
proof of character to evidence of reputation. The issue raised in Woodburn clearly
related to something other than the boy's reputation among his schoolmates. Dr.
Sobchuk's testimony was not "character" evidence within this narrow sense of spe-
cialized legal usage.
298. People v. Coleman, 19 Mich. App. 250, 256, 172 N.W.2d 512, 515 (1969) (cit-
ing Webster's Dictionary).
299. 2 J. WIGMORE, EvIDmENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 876 (rev. ed. 1979)
(emphasis added).
300. Compare 3 D. LouisFLL & C. MurI.ER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 342 (1979), sug-
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"Character for truthfulness" as used in the law of evidence refers
only to the presence or absence of moral restraints on deliberate
falsehood. It seeks to establish personal values which may tend to
override other motives to lie. "Character evidence" does not relate
to the possibility of error. The evidence offered by behavioral scien-
tists may relate to either falsehood or error. As to the latter, such
issues do not involve truthfulness. There are also significant distinc-
tions between the evidentiary concept of character for truthfulness
and expert testimony about mental or emotional dysfunctions pre-
cluding the formation or functioning of a personal moral code. Psy-
chiatric testimony describes the presence or absence of an impulse
towards, or restraint on, falsehood.301 In this sense, the expert testi-
mony is directly analogous to evidence of bias, prejudice, self-inter-
est, and other considerations which may tempt an individual to lie.
Character for truthfulness, on the other hand, describes the pres-
ence or absence of ethical or moral values countering such impulses.
Both types of evidence are relevant to the jury's assessment of credi-
bility. They describe competing influences which will affect the indi-
vidual's decision to tell the truth or to lie. The expert's testimony
can also deal with the presence or absence of factors affecting a wit-
ness only on a particular subject. A person's public reputation may
not reflect the effects of such factors.
In Woodburn, the boy was Dr. Sobchuk's patient. The doctor had
made a diagnosis. In his professional opinion the boy suffered from a
number of mental and emotional conditions. He was able to explain
the demonstrable effects these conditions had upon the child's abil-
ity to distinguish fact from reality. He could describe the boy's
heightened need to gain approval and avoid rejection. He would
have explained the effect of this need on the boy's ability to resist
suggestion. It is fair to assume Dr. Sobchuk would be appalled at
any suggestion that he was passing a personal judgment on the boy's
morals.
Dr. Sobchuk was not a character witness in any common or legal
sense of the word. The Law Court provided persuasive authority for
this proposition. In State v. Willoughby0 2 the defendant was tried
gesting a distinction between "volitional" behavior and that compelled by mental im-
pairment. Louisell and Mueller acknowledge the distinction is difficult for courts to
apply. They also admit it may not correspond to "any line drawn by psychiatrists or
psychologists." The volitional approach is inappropriate for other reasons.
301. It is interesting to note that the DSM EI contains no definition of "charac-
ter." To the extent the behavioral sciences use the word "character," its meaning is
different from the law's usage. The Psychiatric Dictionary indicates that "character"
is currently used in psychiatry as a synonym for "personality." This reference also
lists a number of commonly used terms including the word "character," (eg. "charac-
ter, anal;" "character, ascetic;" "character, daemonic;" "character, epileptic;" "char-
acter, exploitative.") R CAasPEm.., PsYcmATmc DiCnoNAY 102-103 (5th ed. 1981).
302. 507 A.2d 1060 (Me. 1986).
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on charges of murder, kidnapping, robbery, and aggravated assault.
He made several incriminating statements while held in jail awaiting
trial. The prosecution offered these statements as admissions at
trial. The defense intended to offer the testimony of a clinical psy-
chologist to explain the defendant's apparently damaging state-
ments. The psychologist would have testified that the defendant
demonstrated a tendency to "puff up" or exaggerate his participa-
tion in the crime. The "puffing" was prompted by an emotional need
to enhance his own and other inmates' estimation of him.
Relying on State v. Arnold, the trial justice excluded Dr. Rines'
expert opinion as "psychological testimony offered to impeach the
truthfulness" of the defendant. However, a comparison of the na-
ture of the proffered testimony in Arnold with that in the case
before us reveals that this reliance was misplaced. In Arnold, the
psychologist sought to testify solely about the defendant's charac-
ter for truthfulness. We held ... the evidence ... was in-
admissable under Rule 405(a) of the Maine Rules of Evidence,
which provides the exclusive method of proving a trait of character
[is evidence of reputation].
Here, the proffered testimony was not merely "a generalized
description of [the defendant's] disposition in respect to a general
trait, such as honesty," but was medical testimony concerning a
"puffing syndrome," which, like the expert testimony of the bat-
tered child syndrome in Conlogue, "cannot fairly be called 'char-
acter evidence' within the meaning of the rule." . . . [It was a]
description of the puffing syndrome related to [the defendant's]
personality disorder .... Accordingly, Dr. Rines' testimony
should have been admitted. 03
303. State v. Willoughby, 507 A.2d 1060, 1063-64 (Me. 1986) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted) (footnote in original:
We note ... that the nature and form of the psychologist's testimony
here met the requirements for admissibility set forth in State v. Flick, 425
A.2d 167 (Me. 1981). We stated in Flick that a medical expert is not compe-
tent to testify to legal conclusions, and that conclusory opinions, or those
so framed in terms of legal considerations that they will not assist or will
confuse a trier of fact, may be excluded. Id. at 170-71. Dr. Rines' testimony
[in Willoughby] ... was based on observation and testing of the defend-
ant; it was given in layman's terms, so as not to be confusing; and the basis
for the opinion was fully explained.).
The court concluded the error was harmless. In the court's judgment the defendant's
testimony that the damning statements were lies intended to enhance his stature
within the jail population, and the testimony about the "pecking order" within the
jail were sufficient to raise the issue. Dr. Rines' testimony was deemed "cumulative to
that of the defendant and inmates. Furthermore, that the defendant may have exag-
gerated particularly the ... details of his involvement ... does not change the fact
he admitted commission of the crime." Id. at 1064.
The court acknowledged that the defendant's credibility was affected by a medi-
cally diagnosed personality disorder. The court also concluded that testimony by the
person suffering from the disorder is an adequate substitution for testimony by a
qualified expert. Mr. Willoughby faced life imprisonment without parole. The only
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The majority opinion in Woodburn did not discuss its prior deci-
sion in Willoughby. The dissent did. Justice Homby could offer no
explanation of the contradiction between the decisions other than to
remark, "[w]e have had previous difficulty with the wholesale exclu-
sion of opinion testimony."304
CONCLUSION
The courts' struggle with expert testimony on credibility has
spanned the twentieth century. Eighty years have passed since Pro-
fessor Miinsterberg suggested that the behavioral sciences could en-
hance the jury's search for truth. Fifty years ago Dean Wigmore
came to the same conclusion. Almost twenty years have passed since
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Through it all, the
battle between the behavioral sciences and the courts has raged on
undiminished.
Expert opinion testimony is admissible if the witness demon-
strates expertise in a valid body of knowledge, and the testimony
might, if accepted by the jury, help them decide a fact in issue. Mr.
Woodburn called a licensed psychologist selected by the state to
treat his son. The psychologist's professional abilities and integrity
were not challenged by the prosecution or court. The doctor would
have explained that Mr. Woodburn's son was the victim of long-
term emotional trauma at the hands of every adult in his life. As a
result, the boy did not see the world in the same way as other chil-
dren. Fantasy, including sexual fantasies beyond his years, were in-
distinguishable from reality. The boy was also driven by an excep-
tional need to please and avoid displeasing adults. If the jury
accepted even a small part of the testimony, it would have been
helpful in assessing the boy's credibility. They might of course have
rejected or ignored it. That would have been their prerogative. It
was their right to decide, and the right of Mr. Woodburn to have
them decide. But the rights of both were pre-empted.
Justice Hornby spoke for all courts. The refusal to accept expert
testimony on credibility on the same basis as all other expert testi-
mony has caused no end of difficulties. It is a tear in the fabric of
the law which courts must constantly patch. If we cannot accept this
proposition, it is time to say so, and amend the rules to declare ex-
factual corroboration for his self-diagnosis came from "fellow inmates." The doctor's
testimony might have helped the jury assess the credibility of the defense. Given
these facts, deciding that the error was harmless is an astounding result. Nor is it
logical to distinguish between exaggeration of details and admitting commision of
the crime. The defendant pleaded not guilty. His testimony at trial did not consist of
an admission that he committed the crimes. Although not directly stated in the opin-
ion, it is clear the defense claimed the admission and details were both false, and
both a result of defendant's personality disorder.
304. State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343, 348 n.3 (Ale. 1989) (Homby, J.,
dissenting).
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pert testimony on credibility different from all other forms of
evidence.
There is an alternative. We can set aside our ingrained bias
against the behavioral sciences. We can give the lay jury a chance to
prove or disprove our fears. We can treat experts on credibility the
same as those called to testify on other issues. What is more, the
Rules of Evidence require that we do so.
